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introduction1
Pasquale annicchino2
The right to freedom of religion or belief (FoRb) 
is one of the most discussed and debated in the 
international and national arena. This is even 
truer when FoRb meets foreign policy. When 
states advance FoRb through foreign policy, what 
exactly do they aim to protect and to promote? 
When states “engage” religion through foreign 
policy, what, and who, exactly are they engaging? 
These questions might seem tautological, but they 
are central both to academic and policy debates 
today. This is not only a problem in the united 
states, though it has served as a model in many 
instances. The european union, canada italy and 
other states are all considering – and some are 
already implementing – specific policies aimed 
at fostering the protection and the promotion of 
FoRb and other forms of engagement in their for-
eign policies.
These actions, and the interests that they reflect, 
raise important questions. in some sense, as 
lorenzo zucca has argued: “The most obvious 
problem is that action is guided not by an inter-
national-universal understanding of the human 
Right to Freedom of Religion, but rather by a very 
domestic one”3. This may not be peculiar to free-
dom or religion or belief, of course. More impor-
tantly, as Thomas Farr has recognized, in the case 
of the united states: “notwithstanding the hard, 
1. Part of this introduction is taken from my contribu-
tion to “The immanent Frame” post “engaging Reli-
gion at the Department of state”, 30/07/2013, available 
at: http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2013/07/30/engaging-reli-
gion-at-the-department-of-state/. The workshop took 
place at the eui on november 17th 2012.
2. Research Fellow, Robert schuman centre for 
advanced studies, european university institute.
3. see lorenzo zucca, Prince or Pariah? The Place of Freedom 
of Religion in a System of International Human Rights, 
ReligioWest working papers, Rscas 2013/26, p. 15.
creative work of the state Department’s office of 
international Religious Freedom, it would be dif-
ficult to name a single country in the world over 
the past fifteen years where american religious 
freedom policy has helped to reduce religious per-
secution or to increase religious freedom in any 
substantial or sustained way”4. if this is the case – 
and coming from one of the most vocal advocates 
of u.s. religious freedom – then what exactly is 
this global trend to protect religious freedom and 
engage religion about? What exactly is being pro-
tected, and engaged, by whom, and with what con-
sequences? While there is no shortage of immedi-
ate action in this policy domain, we really don’t 
know what the long-run consequences of these 
initiatives will be. and it remains to be seen how 
our conception of the right itself, as well as what it 
means to protect it through law, will change over 
time. The contributions collected in this work rep-
resent the result of an exchange between academ-
ics and policy-makers on this important topic. 
in the first part, lorenzo zucca, Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, and hegumen Philip Ryabykh offer three 
distinct and different theoretical reflections on the 
understanding of the right to freedom of religion 
or belief at a general level and also in the crucial 
distinction between the right understood as an 
individual right and as a collective one. in the sec-
ond part elizabeth shakman hurd, Jeremy Gunn, 
and Matt nelson deal with the political implica-
tion of the protection and promotion of religious 
freedom in foreign policy. The third part collects 
the contribution of policy-makers both from the 
united states and europe. The recent initiatives 
of the european union are analyzed through the 
contribution of Jean bernard bolvin – from the 
4. Thomas F. Farr, Examining the Government’s record 
on Implementing the International Religious Free-
dom Act, testimony before the house committee on 
oversight and Government Reform-subcommittee 
on national security, June 13th, 2013, p. 3 available at: 
http://repository.berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/1306-
13FarrtestimonyexaminingGovernmentsRecordimp
lementinginternationalReligiousFreedomact.pdf
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european external action service – and Denis De 
Jong, which deals with the role of the european 
Parliament in the development of an eu foreign 
policy on freedom of religion or belief. elizabeth 
k. cassidy reviews the united states’ approach to 
the promotion of international religious freedom, 
and Pasquale Ferrara deals with the recent italian 
initiative in the field. 
The contributions offer material for reflection on 
a topic that has recently gained international rel-
evance, a trend that is also illustrated by the recent 
approval by the council of the european union of 
the eu Guidelines on the promotion and protec-
tion of freedom of religion or belief5 and by the 
establishment of a new state Department office of 
Faith-based community initiatives in the united 
states6. knowing that establishing dialogue 
between academics and policy makers is not an 
easy task, we hope to continue along the road we 
have begun with this initiative.
5. eu Foreign affairs council, EU Guidelines on the pro-
motion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, 
24 June 2013.
6. see http://www.state.gov/s/fbci/
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1 
The protection 
and promotion 
of Freedom of 
religion or 
Belief in Foreign 
policy: Three 
puzzles.
loRenzo zucca7
Introduction
The human right to freedom of religion is inter-
preted in radically different ways in the West. 
some insist that religious people should be pro-
tected from external interferences, while others 
insist that non-religious people should be pro-
tected from the interference of religion in public 
affairs. Perhaps the problem is that it is impossible 
to accurately define the human right to freedom of 
religion (hRFR). some call this problem – in my 
view, correctly – the ‘impossibility’ of the human 
right to freedom of religion.8 if this is correct, then 
the practical implication is immense: no interna-
tional action is justified in the name of the hRFR, 
7. Reader in Jurisprudence, king’s college london
8. Winnifred Fallers sullivan, The Impossibility of Reli-
gious Freedom, (Princeton: Princeton university 
Press, 2007).
since every action is bound to amount to the 
unilateral imposition of a conception of freedom 
of religion which does not meet with the under-
standing of the people who are supposed to be res-
cued in the name of the hRFR. 
The first interesting thing to note is that the impos-
sibility of hRFR is true both in secular states and 
in Theocracies. so for example, the iranian con-
stitution entrenches the immutable establishment 
of islam (art. 12),9 and only recognizes a handful 
of other religions as official minorities who have 
a qualified freedom to perform their rites and 
ceremonies (art. 13).10 interestingly, the iranian 
constitution recognizes that other non-Muslims 
are owed respect for their human rights (art. 14).11 
but if one reads articles 13 and 14 together, one 
may conclude that only a few official religious 
minorities have a qualified freedom of religion. 
other non-Muslims may see their human rights 
respected, but amongst these human rights, we 
must infer that there is no hRFR. 
The hRFR, more importantly, is not univocally 
recognized in western secular states. some con-
stitutions accord it a prominent place (us), while 
9. art. 12: The official religion of iran is islam and the 
twelver Ja’fari school [in usual al-Din and fiqh], and 
this principle will remain eternally immutable. […]
10. art. 13: zoroastrian, Jewish, and christian iranians 
are the only recognized religious minorities, who, 
within the limits of the law, are free to perform their 
religious rites and ceremonies, and to act according 
to their own canon in matters of personal affairs and 
religious education.
11. art. 14: in accordance with the sacred verse; (“God 
does not forbid you to deal kindly and justly with those 
who have not fought against you because of your reli-
gion and who have not expelled you from your homes” 
[60:8]), the government of the islamic Republic of iran 
and all Muslims are duty-bound to treat non-Muslims 
in conformity with ethical norms and the principles of 
islamic justice and equity, and to respect their human 
rights. This principle applies to all who refrain from 
engaging in conspiracy or activity against islam and 
the islamic Republic of iran.
others give it a very limited position: the French 
Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the citi-
zen (DRMc), for example, contains a very limited 
recognition.12
The first amendment of the american constitu-
tion accords a much more generous place to free-
dom of religion, and attaches to it a very articu-
lated protection via the first amendment.13 While 
the american constitution carves out a clear 
place in its text, the French Declaration laconi-
cally acknowledges that opinions, even religious 
ones, benefit from the protection against prosecu-
tion. and it is only by way of analogy that we can 
infer that freedom of expression of thought and 
opinions also covers religious people. it is impor-
tant to stress that this freedom of opinion is very 
important, but that it in no way amounts to an 
independent hRFR. 
if it is already complicated to determine the nature 
of human rights, the question becomes even more 
challenging in relation to the hRFR. a judge or a 
policy-maker who attempts to apply this right, will 
need to understand the whole system of human 
rights and how it ranks different interests within 
it, the proper meaning of a freedom and how to 
limit it, and finally, will have to specify the object 
of that freedom, which is particularly difficult in 
relation to religion. if the core case of the right 
to life is a prohibition of killing, then it is not as 
straightforward to determine the central correla-
12. art. X: nul ne doit être inquiété pour ses opinions, 
même religieuses, pourvu que leur manifestation ne 
trouble pas l’ordre public établi par la loi. article Xi 
la libre communication des pensées et des opinions 
est un des droits les plus précieux de l’homme : tout 
citoyen peut donc parler, écrire, imprimer librement, 
sauf à répondre de l’abus de cette liberté, dans les cas 
déterminés par la loi.
13. congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances.
tive duty in relation to the protection of a human 
right to freedom of religion. 
Moreover, the question: ‘what is religion?’ for the 
purpose of determining the right holders and the 
content of the right is an altogether different ques-
tion from ‘what is speech?’ secular institutions 
are notoriously ill-equipped to answer the former 
question. This is partly because secular institu-
tions do not have the theological training required 
to examine the problem. Partly, it is because secu-
lar law encapsulates an understanding of evidence 
that is not compatible with the proofs that reli-
gious people may advance in order to establish 
the genuine nature of their beliefs. Further, the 
question: ‘what is religion?’ can be broken down 
in many difficult quandaries. The broadest under-
lying problem concerns the kind of object that 
religion is, that is, its nature, or its ontology, so to 
speak. 
i am not going to attempt an answer to the broad 
question here, but i will highlight three puzzles 
that flow from this general quandary. Firstly, i 
deal with the problem of scope of the hRFR: how 
do we determine its extent, and what does it cover? 
secondly, i deal with the problem of strength: is 
the interest protected more or less important than 
other interests that are constitutionally protected? 
Thirdly, what happens when this interest clashes 
with other interests protected by other rights? 
I. Scope
to determine the scope of the protection afforded 
by a human right, one must engage in several dif-
ferent steps. Firstly, one must translate the broad 
statement of principle into deontic modalities 
(prohibitions/permissions/obligations).14 so, for 
example, the us constitution prohibits, on one 
hand, the making of laws that establish one reli-
gion, and on the other, the making of laws prohib-
14. Goerg h. von Wright, Deontic Logic, Mind, new 
series, Vol. 60, no. 237. (Jan. 1951) 1-15.
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iting the free exercise of one’s own religion (here 
the prohibition of a prohibition must be read as a 
broad permission). 
secondly, one must establish the correlative duty 
imposed on other people by virtue of the existence 
of a right.15 at the constitutional level, generally 
speaking, a liberty-right is correlated with the 
absence of the right on the part of other persons. 
This means very blandly that if i have a right to 
exercise my religion in the private sphere, nobody 
possesses a right to curtail my right by violating 
my private space. surely the hRFR also implies a 
more general immunity on the part of the right-
holder, which corresponds with a disability on the 
part of the state. For example, the american leg-
islator is the prime duty-bearer of the hRFR, and 
this entails a constitutional disability to make laws 
that prohibit free exercise of religion.
Thirdly, and much more controversially, in order 
to decide the actual scope of prohibitions and the 
extent to which the legislator is disabled, one must 
work out what kind of beliefs and behaviors are 
classified as religious. looking at both the us and 
French texts, we can readily see that there is great 
difference as to the religiously-inspired behavior 
that is covered by constitutional articles. in the 
us, free exercise forms the core of the protection, 
while in France it is religious belief that is pro-
tected. if we compare the two, there is a striking 
difference between protection of religious thought 
and protection of acts based upon religious beliefs. 
so, the distinction between speech and acts is an 
important dividing line between the regime of 
protection in america and that in France. 
another possible dividing line, perhaps even 
more important, is between freedom of religion 
understood as an individual or as a collective- 
group- right. The idea of free exercise has been 
interpreted as leaning towards the protection 
15. Wesley n. hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, 
(Dartmouth: aldershot, 2001).
of individual conscience rather than the protec-
tion of religious groups. in fact, on this point, it 
is clear that the american state attempts to avoid 
supporting any religious group as far as possible, 
even if they obviously have the freedom to gather 
to celebrate religious rituals. however, the basis of 
religious assembly can still be found in the indi-
vidual act of conscience, rather than being derived 
from a special status accorded to religious organi-
zations. Thus in the us, religious conscience is the 
basic element for the recognition and protection 
of some religious beliefs and acts. 
in revolutionary France, the text only mentions 
opinions. in both cases, there seems to be an accent 
on the individual experience, but we must draw an 
important distinction between conscience on one 
side, and thought and opinion on the other. con-
science clearly covers both belief and action, while 
opinions can hardly be stretched to cover actions. 
There is a big difference between conscience and 
thought: the former functions in the manner of 
a sword, whereas thought (or opinion) is more of 
a shield. in other words, once the existence of a 
religious claim of conscience can be established it 
seems as if an exemption from ordinary law might 
be requested. in the case of religious opinion, the 
only concern seems to center around the creation 
of a private space shielded from the interference of 
ordinary law, but in no way does religious opinion 
seem to be entitled to claim an exemption from 
ordinary law based on religious opinion alone.
it is only with more recent human rights treaties 
that the scope of the right to freedom of religion 
covers a collective aspect. in particular the euro-
pean convention of human Rights, article 9 pre-
scribes: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief and 
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freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, prac-
tice and observance. 
The european formulation goes well beyond con-
science and thought, and spans from that individ-
ual dimension to a much more collective one. it 
also moves beyond the private sphere to cover the 
public aspect of religion. 
II. Strenght
in determining the strength of hRFR, one must 
compare the strength of other rights in abstracto; 
it is also necessary to single out the importance 
of religious practices within a society; and finally 
one must compare the freedom of different reli-
gious groups between themselves. 
some american commentators see a paradoxi-
cal treatment of religion.16 Free exercise receives 
special protection, and thus religious conscience 
has special force in comparison to other claims of 
conscience, whereas establishment is the object of 
special burdens, and therefore religion as a collec-
tive enterprise has less strength than other collec-
tive activities. in France, according to the DRMc, 
religious opinions are protected at the same level 
as other opinions, but certainly not more exten-
sively. so, in this sense, religious opinions receive 
equal treatment. as far as religious groups are 
concerned, France allows itself the possibility to 
interfere with them whenever it deems it suitable. 
in both cases we talk about separation between 
church and state, though in fact in america it is 
bilateral separation, while in France it is unilateral 
separation. 
The echR admits of systems of separation and 
establishment, so the strength of the interest pro-
16. christopher l. eisgruber and lawrence G. sager, Reli-
gion and the Constitution, (cambridge: harvard univ. 
Press, 2007).
tected by freedom of religion should be evaluated 
in different contexts. however, it is important 
to note one thing at the outset: if one religion is 
established de jure, then it goes without saying 
that there is a presumption of more favorable 
treatment of that religion vis-à-vis others. estab-
lishment does not promote equality between reli-
gions, and can easily undermine the freedom of 
all other religions. 
so another interesting problem is the following: 
when a state establishes one religion, it may very 
well undermine the freedom of other religions. 
kokkinakis, the first case to reach the strasbourg 
court, asserts the freedom of religion of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in Greece, where the orthodox church 
is constitutionally established and, as a result of 
that, had made proselytism of other religions a 
criminal offence.17 
De jure establishment, however, does not automat-
ically entail that only one religion enjoys the ben-
efit of constitutional protection. in the uk, de jure 
establishment goes hand in hand with a constant 
concern for offering equal benefits to a vast array 
of other religions.18 conversely, de jure separation 
does not altogether prevent the possibility of de 
facto establishment, or at least a strict collabora-
tion between state and one church, as is the case 
in italy between the state and the Vatican. This 
means that one religion enjoys very special ben-
efits, while others may be treated comparatively 
much worse. For example, freedom of religion for 
Muslims in italy does not involve great legal pro-
tection, or public enthusiasm, which results in a 
series of administrative burdens to prevent Mus-
lims from building religious places of worship.19 
17. kokkinakis v. Greece, ecthR, 25/5/1993, (14307/88).
18. Julian Rivers, The Law of Organized Religion. Between 
Establishment and Secularism, (oxford: ouP, 2010). 
19. The ecthR is going to hear the swiss case soon on the 
administrative prohibition to build minarets. 
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an important concern one faces when determin-
ing the strength of the interest protected by reli-
gious freedom is the issue of whether or not we 
are talking about equal freedom for all religions or 
whether one religion is treated better than others.20 
The main concern, though, is about the strength 
of the interest of religious freedom within a sys-
tem of plural rights. Religious freedom in the us 
seems at first glance a central concern of the con-
stitution since it is placed at the very front of the 
bill of rights and is the object of an elaborated set 
of norms. in the French DRMc, however, there is 
no article devoted to religious freedom, and reli-
gion is only mentioned in passing, so it is clear that 
its status, and the strength of the interest resulting 
from it, are much less important. 
in the echR, freedom of religion has an indepen-
dent place amongst derogable rights. We know 
that other rights such as freedom from torture, 
and the right to life have a greater strength at least 
insofar that they are to be considered non-dero-
gable, that is to say, there is no interest that can 
prevail over them. A contrario, it is clear that there 
may be a number of interests that can prevail over 
the interests protected by freedom of religion, and 
paragraph 2 of art. 9 echR confirms this:
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs 
shall be subject only to such limitations as 
re prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of pub-
lic safety, for the protection of public order, 
20. christopher l. eisgruber and lawrence G. sager, Reli-
gion and the Constitution, see supra at 16.
health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
Freedom of religion as embedded in the echR 
has a very broad scope, since it covers thought, 
conscience and religion. Thus, it covers both indi-
vidual and collective beliefs and behavior based 
on those beliefs. however, the strength of the right 
is limited and limitable on the grounds of para-
graph 2 of the same article 9. The strength of the 
interest protected by freedom of religion can be 
limited on the basis of interests of public safety, for 
the protection of public order, health or morality, 
and finally – last but not least – for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others. 
it is also important to note at this stage, that scope 
and strength are linked in a relationship of inverse 
proportionality: the wider the scope of protection, 
the lesser the strength, and vice-versa. if the scope 
was very narrow, then one could always argue that it 
was a matter of preserving the very core of the right. 
III. Conflicts
The most difficult cases of limitations are those of 
conflicts between the right to freedom of religion 
and other rights. as pointed out above, and as a 
matter of law, freedom of religion can be limited 
in order to guarantee the promotion and protec-
tion of other rights. examples of such conflicts are 
multiple, but we cannot discuss them all. here we 
can only present a few examples. 
Freedom of religion can conflict with other free-
doms, such as, for example, freedom of expression. 
it may be argued that in plural democratic societ-
Table 1: this table summarizes various possible combinations showing the protean nature of freedom of religion
strenght/scope individual collective
high strenght conscience (e.g. usa) Group R (echR para. 1)
low strenght Thought (France DRMc) Group R with limitations (echR para. 2)
Freedom of Religion or Belief in Foreign Policy. Which one?13
ies, people are free to express negative judgments 
about religious practices, including judgments that 
are offensive. after all, if protected expression was 
only positive expression, then there would not be 
any need to proclaim such freedom. however, it 
can also be argued that offensive opinions con-
cerning religious minorities can undermine the 
respect of the whole community towards religious 
minorities as well as undermining the status of that 
minority within a wider society. in other words, 
offensive speech can easily polarize societies and 
create widespread social tensions within and out-
side the national territory. a common example of 
this scenario is the Mohammed cartoon saga. 
This issue is, i think, exacerbated all the more if 
we look at the case law of the ecthR that lim-
ited the artistic expression of a movie director in 
the otto Preminger case on the grounds that the 
movie could offend the religious majority in the 
tyrol region.21 The court reasoned that the inter-
ference with the applicant association’s freedom of 
expression was prescribed by law, but the seizure 
and forfeiture of the film were aimed at ‘the pro-
tection of the rights of others’, or more precisely, 
the right to respect for one’s religious feelings, and 
to ensure religious peace. The court assessed the 
conflicting interests of the exercise of two funda-
mental freedoms guaranteed under the conven-
tion and concluded that the austrian authorities 
did not overstep their margin of appreciation. it 
is not clear whether the same protection would be 
afforded to religious feelings of a minority as in 
the case of Mohammed cartoons. 
in any event, what matters here is to highlight that 
we have two specific problems: first, one has to 
determine whether the right to respect for one’s 
religious feelings is within the scope of freedom 
of religion. secondly, whether that right is strong 
enough to prevail over freedom of expression. 
21. otto-Preminger-institut v. austria, ecthR, 20/9/1994, 
(13470/87)
both questions are determined by the judge, who 
can only rely on her own cultural assumptions 
about the nature and value of religion. 
another set of conflicts more closely concerns the 
very nature of freedom of religion. it is a matter 
of knowing whether religion as an established 
societal practice of institutions can discrimi-
nate between some categories of people who are 
normally protected against discrimination. The 
abstract conflict is between equality and liberty. 
This conflict is particularly difficult, as it may put 
a great pressure on religions to adapt to societal 
standards, which some religions are desperately 
trying to resist. The conflict takes place in many 
different settings. however, the workplace is a per-
fect example of a domain where the fight against 
discrimination has been strong in recent times, at 
least in europe.22 so, if religion enters the work-
place, the tension between non-discrimination 
and liberty of religion is more visible. 
There are, in fact, various tensions. The employer 
may be secular, and employees may ask for the 
possibility of wearing religious symbols;23 in this 
case the discrimination is against religious peo-
ple. The employer may also be the state or a pub-
lic authority, and the employee may be in a situa-
tion in which she refuses to carry out basic public 
functions that are at odds with some religious 
precepts, which themselves are discriminatory.24 
or, the employer may be religious and dismiss 
the employee who does not meet some religious 
22. in the usa, the doctrine of ministerial exception bars 
the possibility of applying anti-discrimination laws. 
23. The cases of eweida (eweida v. the united kingdom 
– no. 48420/10) and chaplin (chaplin v. the united 
kingdom – application no. 59842/10), pending before 
the ecthR, deal with the restriction on wearing 
christian crosses in the working environment. 
24. The case of ladele (ladele v. the united kingdom – 
no. 51671/10), also pending before the ecthR, deals 
with the dismissal of ladele following her refusal to 
register civil unions for homosexual people. 
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standards.25 assuming that churches can employ 
whomsoever they want, is it possible to fire people 
who no longer meet some religious precepts that 
would normally be seen as discriminatory? 
in other words, when religion engages in secular 
employment contract, does that make the reli-
gious workplace free from the constraints applica-
ble to the non-religious workplace? again we have 
a problem of scope: to what extent does freedom 
of religion color the activities in which religion 
engages? Further, there is a problem of strength: 
to what extent does the special protection of free-
dom of religion prevail over other constitutionally 
entrenched interests such as non-discrimination? 
The answers to these questions are not written in 
stone, and depend heavily on very contingent and 
local understandings of the nature and value of 
religion in a discrete society. This simple fact must 
caution us against the temptation of acting abroad in 
the name of our own contingent and local convic-
tions about the human right to freedom of religion. 
25. several cases have reached the ecthR in the last 
5 years. i cite here lombardi Vallauri, 20/10/2009 
(39128/05), whose employment contract at the catho-
lic university of Milan was terminated on the ground 
that the congregation of catholic education refused 
its approval after 20 years of employment. 
Conclusion
These brief considerations highlight the puzzles 
that judges and policy-makers necessarily face 
when trying to pin down the meaning of the 
hRFR. This is not to mention the difficulties 
related to conceptions of freedom of religion in 
non-Western states, which are even greater. Those 
puzzles do not have straightforward answers, and 
are dealt with by reference to highly contingent 
and local conceptions of religion that are not likely 
to be universalized. 
When a policy-maker has to grapple with prob-
lems of religious freedom, she is bound to face two 
extraordinarily complicated problems:
1. What is the nature of the right to freedom of 
religion?
2. how does one know what counts as religion 
across the world if one begins from the start-
ing point of one’s local conception of religion?
The second problem is possibly even greater than 
the first. For, if we simply assume that freedom 
of religion deserves international protection, 
the problems begin when policy-makers have to 
assess whether to intervene or not. in light of pre-
vious considerations, one may wonder whether it 
is advisable to single out freedom of religion as 
worthy of special international protection. i hope 
it is clear by now that humility and prudence mili-
tate against intervening abroad in the name of the 
hRFR. Perhaps, it is high time to abandon moral-
izing crusades. 
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religious 
group rights: 
Four analytic 
Touchstones
FReDeRick MaRk GeDicks26
Introduction
a group right creates a zone of group autonomy 
within the boundary marked by the right: it walls 
the state out from “internal” group affairs that fall 
within the boundaries of the right, and in that 
sense creates a space within which the group may 
act free of government supervision and control. 
like individual rights, group rights preserve indi-
vidual liberty by rebuffing government oppres-
sion.
but if the state is itself an instrument of liberty 
rather than oppression,27 what then? The group 
right that walls the state out, necessarily walls 
members in, leaving them without the liberating 
protections of the state “outside the walls.” indi-
vidual group members are then left to the uncer-
tain mercies of the group, without the protections 
26. Guy anderson chair & Professor of law, brigham 
young university law school, Provo, utah usa. i am 
grateful to olivier Roy and Pasquale annicchino for 
the invitation to deliver this paper at the Workshop.
27. See generally isaiah berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty 
(1958), in isaiah berlin, Four essays on liberty 
(oxford: oxford university Press, 1969).
against group oppression that the state would oth-
erwise provide. The group right that enables group 
liberty, in other words, also enables individual 
oppression.
after elaborating this paradox and examining it 
in the context of religious groups, i discuss and 
apply four possible dimensions of a potential doc-
trine of religious group rights. i conclude by sug-
gesting that the threat to individual liberty calls 
for caution rather than enthusiasm in recognizing 
religious group rights.
I. The Paradox of (Religious) 
Groups
Groups simultaneously serve liberty-conferring 
and liberty-depriving functions in liberal democ-
racy. Groups are crucial to the creation and main-
tenance of personal meaning and identity; most 
people define who they are by reference to groups 
to which they belong or with which they identify. 
Groups also protect individuals from excesses of 
the contemporary liberal state, before which sin-
gle individuals are largely powerless. and finally, 
groups are an important source of social values, 
which the liberal state is largely constrained from 
developing and promoting itself.
but if the liberal state may excessively intrude 
upon individual liberty, so may private groups. 
The dependence of individuals on group norms 
and narratives for personal meaning leaves them 
vulnerable to group coercion: individuals whose 
identity is psychologically embedded in a group 
culture often feel group pressure to behave in ways 
they otherwise wouldn’t, to avoid the existential 
crisis of expulsion. When government interven-
tion in group matters would enhance individual 
autonomy, as in the enforcement of antidiscrimi-
nation laws against racist or sexist group norms, 
group rights that block such intervention subvert 
individual autonomy. Finally, while groups are 
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important sources of social values, group values 
are often not those endorsed by political majorities, 
and may actually undermine majoritarian values. 
Gender equality, for example, is both enforced by 
contemporary liberal democracies and rejected by 
much of christianity, islam, and Judaism.
Religious groups present an especially intense 
instance of the general paradox of groups. Reli-
gious groups supply complex explanations and 
thick narratives of the meaning of human life, and 
in the name of “religious freedom” often claim spe-
cial exemption from laws that bind everyone else. 
Religious groups are thus an especially important 
source of the personal identities of their believ-
ers who, in turn, are thus especially vulnerable to 
the unregulated pressure and oppression by the 
religious group. These connections to individual 
autonomy and vulnerability are heightened when 
the member is employed by the religious group, 
which adds economic dependence into the mix of 
vulnerabilities.
it bears emphasis that the religious character of 
a group does not immunize it from antisocial 
behavior—current and past events bear witness 
that religions do bad things. Religious groups can 
be racist, they can be sexist, and they can be cruel, 
bureaucratic, and vindictive. stereotypical think-
ing assumes that churches engage in bad behav-
ior at lower rates than secular groups, but recent 
events suggest otherwise. instances of clergy 
abuse and sex discrimination, for example, seem 
as common in churches as in society generally, if 
not more so.
II. Analytic Touchstones
The paradoxical quality of groups in liberal 
democracy makes it challenging to construct a 
doctrine of religious group freedom, and liberal 
theory consequently lacks well developed doc-
trines of religious group rights. let me suggest 
four touchstones for thinking about the content 
of such a doctrine: Whether the religious group 
has an ontological status independent of that of 
its members, the extent to which it externalizes 
the costs of membership, the viability of exit from 
the group, and whether the group right is con-
ceptualized as a classic “right” or instead as an 
“immunity.”28
a. Status
are religious group rights independent or deriva-
tive of individual rights? Put another way, is pro-
tection of religious group autonomy an end in 
itself, or is the rationale for protecting religious 
groups rooted in their protection of their individ-
ual members? as Professor zucca suggested in this 
workshop, the u.s. tradition has been hostile to a 
group status independent of the rights and mem-
bers of individual group members,29 though as i 
explain below, this may be changing. The answer 
to this question determines whether a religious 
group right properly protects the group regard-
less of how it treats its members, or whether group 
protection is called for only when such protection 
would also shelter individual group members.
Religious groups tend to react to external threats 
and internal dissent like all organizations, by plac-
ing the survival and well-being of the group above 
the best interests of any individual member or of 
members generally. The sex-abuse scandals, again, 
vividly illustrate this. if a group’s rights are merely 
the derivative aggregate of rights held by their mem-
bers, it would be difficult to justify rights that pro-
tect the group at the expense of its members. only 
if the group has a doctrinal status independent of 
that of its members is such a result justifiable.
28. See generally Wesley n. hohfeld, Some Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 
yale l.J. 16 (1913).
29. lorenzo zucca, The Protection  and Promotion of Free-
dom of Religion or Belief in Foreign Policy: Three Puz-
zles, in this volume.
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b. External Costs
What costs do religious group rights impose on 
persons who do not belong to the group? This is 
the problem of negative externalities, which arises 
when the full costs of some particular behav-
ior are not borne by the actor, but instead are 
“externalized” onto others who do not receive its 
compensating benefits. The classic example of an 
externalized cost is air and water pollution gener-
ated by a manufacturing plant: The plant and its 
owners benefits from the increased profits from 
not having to bear the expense of environmental 
safeguards, but the costs of the pollution are born 
by all those who use the water and air, and not just 
by the owners who receive the plant’s increased 
profits.
it is axiomatic that religious groups cannot be per-
mitted to act in ways that impose the costs of con-
formity to religious group norms on those who 
do not belong to the religious group. Religions 
are free, for example, to discriminate on the basis 
of race or sex in choosing their leaders. Members 
impliedly consent to such discriminatory norms, 
but nonmembers have not, and cannot be forced 
to bear their costs.
c. Exit
how easy is it to leave the religious group? since 
a theory of implied consent derived from volun-
tary religious group membership underwrites the 
power of the group to impose its norms on mem-
bers, it is appropriate that groups enforce religious 
conformity on their members only so long as the 
members are free to leave the group. This is both a 
legal and a social or cultural question. even when 
no legal barriers exist to a member’s exit from the 
group, other factors may raise barriers to exit. For 
example, when a family with children belongs 
to the group, one spouse may feel that he or she 
cannot leave the group if doing so would restrict 
access to children or substantially impair parent-
child relations. similarly, when the group sup-
plies a major component of member identity, as 
is the case with many religious groups, members 
may find it psychologically impossible to leave, for 
abandoning the group is tantamount to abandon-
ing one’s identity. Financially dependent members 
lacking employment and education risk poverty 
and homelessness if they leave the group.
d. Conceptualization
is the religious group right part of a classic right-
duty relation, or is it rather an immunity corre-
lated to a disability on the government’s power to 
act with respect to certain subject-matters? Reli-
gious group rights are most defensible when (i) the 
group is conceptualized as having an ontological 
status independent of that of its members, thereby 
justifying group autonomy even when it conflicts 
with the well-being of group members; (ii) recog-
nition of a religious group right does not exter-
nalize the costs of membership on nonmembers 
or on society as a whole; and (iii) it is legally and 
otherwise viable for members to leave the group. 
even when a religious group right is prima facie 
cognizable, however, the effect of the right when it 
is deployed depends on whether it is conceptual-
ized as a classic “right” or instead as an immunity.
commentators sympathetic to religious group 
autonomy are fond of describing religious group 
rights in terms of “jurisdiction” and even “sover-
eignty,” as if religious groups were separate coun-
tries whose sovereign status immunizes them 
from laws and actions of the country wherein they 
and their members reside. This is, at best, an exag-
geration. no private group residing in a liberal 
democracy enjoys sovereign immunity from the 
actions of government, even for its internal affairs. 
Given a sufficiently important reason, government 
can and does intervene in “internal” religious 
group matters as, yet again, the child abuse scan-
dals demonstrate. Theories of how and when the 
government may intervene, however, vary consid-
erably, depending on whether they conceptualize 
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religious group rights as “rights” which the gov-
ernment is duty-bound to observe in exercising its 
legitimate powers, or instead as “immunities” cor-
related with structural disabilities that withhold 
sovereign power from government and preclude if 
from acting in the first place.
There is a lot at stake in the answer to this ques-
tion. Professor zucca, for example, discusses the 
right to freedom of belief as if it were both a right 
which government has a duty to observe, and an 
immunity with which government is disabled 
from interfering. but these jurisprudential con-
cepts are distinct, and lead to distinct doctrinal 
outcomes.
The Free exercise clause of the u.s First amend-
ment is such a right: it imposes a general duty 
of religious equality on government, requiring 
it to avoid targeting religion overtly or covertly. 
because a right conditions or limits the exercise 
of power that the government legitimately pos-
sesses and could properly exercise in absence of 
the right, the right-holder may waive the right if 
he or she freely chooses to do so, and protection of 
the right is properly balanced against government 
interests that conflict with such protection. Thus, 
a religious group right may be waived or other-
wise lost by group action or inaction not consis-
tent with assertion of the right, and may also be 
overridden by an important government interest.
structural immunities, on the other hand, allo-
cate sovereign power in the first place, granting or 
withholding such power from government, for the 
benefit of society as a whole. When a constitution 
affirmatively denies sovereign power to the gov-
ernment, the government is absolutely disabled 
from exercising the power so denied. so structural 
immunities may not be waived, because they are 
imposed for the benefit of the whole society, and 
not just for those whose personal liberty might 
be threatened in a particular instance. nor does 
it matter that the government has an important 
or even “compelling” reason for exercising the 
power: There is no justification sufficient to invest 
the government with sovereign power that its con-
stituting document withholds from it. The u.s. 
establishment clause is such a structural disabil-
ity: Federal and state governments are absolutely 
prohibited from establishing religion, regardless 
of the importance of the government’s reasons for 
doing so, and even if no one objects. Government 
action which exceeds the structural limits marked 
by the establishment clause is not, and cannot 
ever be, constitutionally legitimate.
When religious group rights are conceptualized as 
structural disabilities, the focus is necessarily on 
the breadth or subject-matter of the disability—
that is, the field of action the government is barred 
from entering by the disability. For example, the 
establishment clause disables government from 
making theological decisions on behalf of a church, 
as when, for example, courts are called upon to 
allocate church property between two factions in 
the membership by awarding the property to the 
faction that has most faithfully adhered to church 
doctrine. but courts remain free to decide such 
factional disputes on nontheological grounds—
“neutral principles of secular law”—by looking at 
deeds, trust, and other secular evidence of prop-
erty ownership. Government is free to intervene in 
internal religious group affairs, in other words, so 
long as the intervention falls outside the bounds of 
the subject-matter definition which sets the limits 
of the establishment clause disability.
When a religious group right is conceptualized 
as a “right,” the analytic focus is on the group’s 
actions—did it expressly forego the protections of 
the right, or act in a manner that would be incon-
sistent with an intention to claim such protec-
tions?—and the government’s interests in regu-
lating the religious group—are these sufficiently 
weighty to justify setting the right aside in the 
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particular circumstance? such considerations are 
irrelevant, however, if the religious group right 
is conceptualized as an immunity—that is, as a 
structural disability on government’s power to 
act; there the focus is on the definition of the sub-
ject-matter as to which the government is disabled 
from acting—is the government action within or 
without the bounds of the disability?
III. An Example: The U.S. 
Contraception-Coverage 
Mandate
The current controversy in the united states 
over mandated contraception coverage by health 
insurance plans provides a useful example of how 
these doctrinal religious group-rights touchstones 
might function in actual application. Many reli-
gious groups have asserted a group free exercise 
right not to comply with the so-called “contra-
ception mandate” of the u.s. Patient Protection 
and affordable care act (the “aca”), President 
obama’s signature legislative accomplishment 
during his first term. The aca seeks to expand 
health-insurance coverage and covered health-
care services in the united states. accordingly, 
the aca mandates that all “preventive health-
care services” be covered by private health insur-
ance plans without additional co-payments, co-
insurance, deductibles, or other cost beyond the 
monthly insurance premium. however, the regu-
lations promulgated by the obama administration 
define all FDa-approved methods of contracep-
tion (including “emergency contraception” like 
the “morning-after” and “week-after” pills and 
intrauterine devices, which avoid pregnancy by 
preventing a fertilized egg from implanting in the 
womb) as “preventive healthcare services”—hence 
the term, “contraception mandate.” churches and 
their “integrated auxiliaries” are exempt from 
complying with the mandate, but most religious 
hospitals, colleges, charities, and other religious 
nonprofits are subject to it, as are all for-profit 
businesses.
a number of religious nonprofits and for-profit 
businesses have challenged the mandate as a vio-
lation of their group right to freely exercise anti-
contraception religious beliefs. Many of these 
plaintiffs are affiliated with the Roman catholic 
church, whose teachings prohibiting use of “arti-
ficial” contraception have been rejected by most 
american catholics; others are conservative Prot-
estants who conscientiously object to emergency 
contraception as equivalent to abortion. all of the 
plaintiffs employ and/or serve large numbers of 
persons who do not share their anti-contraception 
beliefs.
how should one think about a group free exer-
cise right in this context? one can begin with an 
examination of religious group status, external-
ized costs, possibilities of exit, and how the right 
might be conceptualized.
in the wake of the supreme court’s recent deci-
sions in Citizens United and Hosanna-Tabor,30 
there is a powerful argument that religious and 
certain other groups have an ontological status in 
u.s. constitutional law that is wholly independent 
of the individual interests of their members. Thus, 
the fact that the interests and beliefs of employees 
and other members of the plaintiff groups diverge 
from those of the group itself is not highly rele-
vant—although it is at the least ironic that the vast 
majority of Roman catholics in the united states 
have rejected their church’s anti-contraception 
teachings. if the plaintiff groups hold a free exer-
cise right, the group’s status as a right-holder is 
30. hosanna-tabor ch. & sch. v. eeoc, 132 s.ct. 694 
(2012) (recognizing unconditional right of religious 
group to terminate schoolteacher in ministerial call-
ing); citizens united v. Fec, 558 u.s. 310 (2010) 
(recognizing corporation as person whose speech 
rights were unconstitutionally infringed by campaign 
finance regulation).
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organic rather than derivative of the right-holding 
status of its members.
externalized costs and possibilities for exit, how-
ever, cut the other way. exempting the plain-
tiff groups from the mandate would allow those 
groups to impose the costs of their anti-contra-
ception beliefs on employees who do not share 
them, many of whom do not even belong to the 
group’s affiliated religion. such employees would 
be denied the statutory benefits of no-cost con-
traception to which they are otherwise entitled 
under the aca. employees who desire these 
benefits may quit their jobs, but the practical 
obstacles are high: They may be required to take 
a cut in salary or to relocate, they may forfeit 
unvested employee benefits available at the plain-
tiff group, and in a weak economy they may not 
find alternative employment at all. here one sees 
an illustration of Professor zucca’s insight that 
conscience exemptions can sometimes function 
offensively, as a sword against society, and not as 
a mere defense to government action.31
on balance, the two of the first three doctrinal 
touchstones weigh against recognition of a group 
right. but even if a group right of exemption from 
the mandate were recognized, its strength and 
reach would depend on whether it is a right or 
instead an immunity from government action. 
if a group right, an exemption from the mandate 
might still be expressly or impliedly waived—say, 
by a religious group’s voluntary entrance into 
employment and service markets governed by 
public values that condemn the imposition of one’s 
religious beliefs on others. The exemption would 
also be liable to override by a compelling govern-
ment interest—say, the need to equalize currently 
gender-disparate healthcare costs borne by men 
and women, or the need to improve gender equity 
in the workplace by affording women greater con-
trol over child-bearing. on the other hand, if the 
31. lorenzo zucca, see supra at 29.
right is conceptualized as an immunity correlated 
with a structural disability preventing govern-
ment from burdening religious group practices, as 
much pro-religion jurisdiction/sovereignty rheto-
ric implies, then the group right is absolute, with 
neither waiver nor balancing available to mitigate 
its effects on employees who do not share their 
employer’s anti-contraception beliefs.
*   *   *
Religious group rights seem normatively attrac-
tive, but they do not come without sobering costs 
to individual liberty, which ought to be carefully 
weighed against benefits before such rights are 
irretrievably embedded in Western jurisprudence.
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new challenges To 
religious Freedom 
in europe
heGuMen PhiliP Ryabykh32
Introduction
The understanding and the interpretation of reli-
gious freedom today depends on the role that 
religion plays in society. to my mind, at least, 
three factors make religion important from this 
perspective: first, the “new visibility” of religions 
in the public sphere; second, the normative posi-
tions of religions on issues of social life; and third, 
the various ways in which religions try to achieve 
these positions, especially extremist forms. in this 
paper, i will make five points in order to substanti-
ate this claim. 
I. New visibility of religions
The thesis of the growing religious presence in 
societies is contested from time to time. Dis-
cussions take place about the exact numbers of 
the faithful, the “quality” of their faith or their 
links with religious institutions. it is also obvi-
ous that the religious landscape, or more gener-
ally the “worldview landscape”, in each country 
is dynamic. The principle of religious freedom is 
called upon in a democratic society to regulate the 
relations between different religions and beliefs in 
a changing situation.
32. Dr. of theology, Dr. of political sciences, representa-
tive of Russian orthodox church in strasbourg to the 
council of europe
however, we are aware of examples of times when 
religious groups have strived to radically change 
the religious situation in a country. Religious 
freedom has sometimes been misused by various 
governments or non-governmental forces as an 
instrument to promote “their” religions in other 
countries. For example, on april 15 2012, Mus-
lim salafists distributed one million copies of the 
koran on the streets of Germany and planned to 
distribute 25 million more in austria and switzer-
land. some Western christian organizations act 
in the same manner in Muslim countries. such 
actions are motivated by the understanding that 
relations between religions function as a market of 
supply and demand. but such an approach leads to 
the establishment of the right of the stronger, and 
may result in conflicts and instability in society. 
From my point of view, religious freedom must 
not be misused to protect missionary strategies 
that aim to achieve radical change in the religious 
landscape of a country. The just approach to the 
protection of religious freedom cannot accept the 
ambitions of different religious or non-religious 
groups which try to expand within a society at the 
expense of other groups, or indeed human rights.
II. Balanced protection of 
religious minorities and 
majorities
it is also unjust when international religious free-
dom advocacy refers to religious freedom only in 
the sense of the protection of religious minorities. 
Religious freedom does not exist in the abstract 
and pure form. it is always embodied in a partic-
ular individual way. in europe, christianity has 
historically represented the main religious belief. 
People’s choices in favor of traditional christi-
anity as already rooted in europe should also be 
protected by religious freedom, and not just the 
freedom of religions which have appeared rela-
tively recently. That is why the Russian church 
calls for the preservation and development of a 
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worthy christian presence in the private and pub-
lic spheres of european countries. This concerns 
not only religious symbols, but also the presence 
of christian content in education and training, 
media, culture and social projects. 
This explains why the Russian orthodox church 
has expressed disagreement with the decision of 
the european court of human Rights in 2009 on 
the removal of crucifixes from classrooms in italy 
(the Lautsi-case)33 and why Russia supported italy 
in its appeal to the Grand chamber of the stras-
bourg court. one cannot but express satisfaction 
at the fact that the court changed its decision. 
now the court is considering two new cases, this 
time from the united kingdom (shirley chap-
lin and nady eveyda)34, which are very closely 
related to the italian case. These two women were 
forbidden from wearing a baptismal cross in the 
workplace. 
The protection of the rights of christians in 
europe or of Muslims in asia must not mean 
discrimination against other religions or secular 
philosophical beliefs, especially if they have been 
present in these countries for a long time. today 
there are instances of severe violence and crime 
against christians in some Muslim countries. We 
also see examples of injustice and offenses against 
Muslims in europe and in the united states of 
america.
of course, increasing diversity requires a special 
effort to maintain a just balance and mutual respect 
between different communities in manifesting 
their religions. in each case, it requires great effort 
to fairly distribute public space between religions, 
and to create a new balance between religious and 
secular symbols, holidays and clothes. This is pos-
sible only when every religious community volun-
33. lautsi v. italy, ecthR 3/11/2009 (30814/06) and 
18/03/2011 (Grand chamber)
34. eweida and others v. united kingdom, ecthR 
15/01/2013 (48420/10; 59842/10; 51671/10; and 36516/10)
tarily accepts the level of public and government 
attention which corresponds to its size and impact 
on society and the rights of others. 
in modern dynamic societies, it is just not only 
to protect religious minorities at some selective 
choice but to consider the complexity of different 
(historical and cultural) factors and build a bal-
anced system of protection of rights for religious 
majorities and minorities.
III. Religious freedom and 
morality
Modern society is becoming more and more plu-
ralistic in its approaches to anthropology and, as 
a result, to morality too. if in the past ‘pluralism’ 
referred to different visions of changes in societies 
on the same anthropological basis, pluralism today 
concerns the understanding of the very nature of 
what the human being actually is: what life and 
death are (the questions of euthanasia and abor-
tion); what family is (the questions of surrogate 
motherhood, artificial insemination and adoption 
of children by same-sex couples); what gender is 
(the interpretation of trans-sexuality). all these 
notions are dealt with in religious teachings.
For religions, the adoption of general norms 
which contradict religious views in a society is 
a real challenge. sometimes there are serious 
clashes between different values or their inter-
pretations. unfortunately, today’s international 
and national institutions tend to accept a vision 
of ‘what a person is’ based on attitudes and per-
ceptions supported by only one section of society. 
intentionally or not, this leads to discrimination 
against supporters of other approaches, including 
religious ones. This trend is particularly evident in 
respect of questions relating to gender and family 
relations, and could lead to a breach of peace in 
society and to societal destabilization.
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as to the Russian orthodox church, it adopted 
a set of documents concerning social life and 
anthropology – The Basis of Social Conception 
(2000), the Document on Human Dignity, Free-
dom and Rights (2008) and others.35 in these 
documents, the Russian church’s point of view 
has been expressed clearly: “The christian law is 
fundamentally supra-social. it cannot be part of 
the civil law, though in christian societies it can 
make a favorable influence on it as its moral foun-
dation”. This does not refer to the conquest of sec-
ular space, because the document continues: “any 
attempt to develop civil, criminal and public law 
based on the Gospel alone cannot be efficient, for 
without the full churching of life, that is without 
complete victory over sin, the law of the church 
cannot become the law of the world. This victory 
is possible, however, only in the eschatological 
perspective” (5.iV).
today religions try to preserve their freedom 
not only in an exclusive way, claiming for them-
selves the right that some norms may not apply 
to religious communities, but they also insist on 
their right to contribute to the shaping of the gen-
eral norms that apply to the whole of society. it 
is real challenge for international religious free-
dom advocacy to create a mechanism that satis-
fies the legal expectations of religious people and 
to protect their anthropological views stemming 
directly from their religious convictions. This does 
not mean that the principle of the secular state is 
rejected as such. The presence of religious argu-
ments in public debates does not mean that legal 
texts should make reference to sacred texts. but 
religious views and a religious agenda can legally 
be a part of society through democratic proce-
dures and can be freely supported by citizens. This 
35. Russian orthodox church, The Bases of the Social 
Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church, Moscow, 
2000, availiable at: http://www.mospat.ru/en/docu-
ments/social-concepts/; Russian orthodox church, 
The Russian Orthodox’s Church Basic Teaching on 
Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights, Moscow, 2008). 
http://www.mospat.ru/en/documents/dignity-free-
dom-rights/.
principle is reflected in article 9 of the conven-
tion for the Protection of human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms: “freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, 
to manifest his religion or belief”. so religion can 
legally participate in society life, with its agenda, 
through the democratic procedures.
i should stress that this right to practice religion is 
a personal right, but one which can also be realized 
through collective forms, such as that of a religious 
community. on the basis of individual religious 
choice, a person can arrange his or her entire life, 
including professional and social aspects, and give 
voice to his or her convictions through democratic 
procedures. a religious world-view should again 
be recognized as a source of social principles and 
political norms for individuals and for groups of 
people. This is what could be called a new or “post-
secular” understanding of secularism.
IV. Need for a new interpretation 
of “secular state”
today, we are also aware of claims that the inter-
nal rules of a religious community should be in 
accordance with the general democratic order. 
however, let me recall again article 9: “Freedom 
to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be sub-
ject only to such limitations as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of public safety, for the protection of 
public order, health or morals, or for the protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of others”. What 
happens when morals change in a society and 
become increasingly pluralistic? how should reli-
gious freedom, which also extends to freedom of 
religious teaching and self-organization, be pro-
tected in this case? christian churches usually rely 
on canon law to define their internal life. in the 
Social Conception of the Russian church, we read: 
“in the church founded by the lord Jesus, there 
is special law based on the Divine Revelation. it is 
the canon law” (iV. 5).
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There are a number of cases before the european 
court of human Rights concerning relations 
between the internal regulations of church com-
munities and secular legislation. on January 31 
2012, for example, the court ruled in the case of 
the “Good Shepherd” union against Romania.36 in 
this decision, the court took the side of a group 
of people who wanted to create a trade union of 
clergy, on the basis of civil law, within the Roma-
nian orthodox church in order to engage in dia-
logue with church leadership. This idea, which 
was supported by the court, strongly contradicts 
canon law. another decision, which violated the 
internal regulations of the bulgarian orthodox 
church, was adopted by the european court of 
human Rights in 2008 in the case of “Metropoli-
tan innocent against bulgaria”37. in our view, in 
such cases the court should seek to respect inter-
nal rules and regulations and should refrain from 
interfering in religious affairs.
There is also a risk of substituting spiritual and 
moral values with social principles. at an annual 
meeting of the committee of Ministers dedicated 
to the religious dimension of intercultural dia-
logue, which took place in luxembourg in 2011, 
a member of the Parliamentary assembly of the 
council of europe said that the values of the 
council of europe should be higher than religious 
values. indeed, sometimes political authorities 
seek to define values of the spiritual and moral 
order which are beyond their competence. to 
my mind, the legal system should not make deci-
sions on spiritual or moral issues, such as paternal 
behavior or human sexual behavior. spiritual and 
moral standards must exist freely in society, as the 
source for legislation. 
36. sindicatul Păstorul cel bun v. Romania, ecthR, 
31/01/2012, (2330/99).
37. case of holy synod of the bulgarian orthodox 
church (Metropolitan inokentiy) and others v. bul-
garia, ecthR, 16/9/2010, (412/03; 35677/04)
The preamble to the statute of the council of 
europe in 1949 reads: “stating its commitment 
to the spiritual and moral values, which are the 
common heritage of their peoples and the true 
source of individual freedom, political liberty and 
the rule of law, principles which form the basis of 
all genuine democracy”. Thus in the preamble, the 
different spheres (“spiritual and moral values” and 
“principles of liberty”; “rule of law” and “democ-
racy”) were distinguished. Religious communities 
exist within the first sphere, and the second sphere 
is more characteristic of states and intergovern-
mental organizations. but there is no mention in 
the preamble to the statute of a barrier existing 
between the spheres; on the contrary, the docu-
ment emphasizes the connection between the two 
spheres, calling the spiritual and moral values 
“the common heritage” and “the true source”.
so there is a need for a new interpretation of the 
notion of a “secular state”, in order to eliminate 
discrimination against religious communities in 
the shaping of norms in societies. The principle of 
secularity applies only to functions and forms of 
state activities and not to all areas of societal life. 
Good practice of religious freedom occurs when 
the state ensures the freedom to join or to leave 
a religious group and does not intervene in the 
internal affairs of religious organizations.
V. Raising hostility against 
religious communities and 
believers
Dialogue and interaction between different reli-
gions and worldviews are very important aspects 
of religious freedom. in a multicultural society, it 
is necessary to maintain respectful standards of 
dialogue and discussion, especially in light of the 
rapid developments in electronic communication 
and the need to protect freedom of speech. The 
report of the eminent Persons Group of the coun-
cil of europe, “living together - diversity and 
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freedom in europe of the XXi century”38, which 
was prepared in 2011, was designated to work out 
mechanisms to balance religious freedom and 
freedom of expression and assembly. 
The report is a call to refrain from distortion and 
inaccurate statements concerning religious beliefs, 
including ridicule or disparagement of religions, 
their founders, or sacred symbols. however, this 
call is followed by the remark: “it is not the prov-
ince of the law or the public authorities to enforce 
such consideration”.39 now, in our view, it is obvi-
ous that a multicultural society cannot accept spe-
cial laws on blasphemy, but insults to the religious 
feelings of citizens and slander against the activi-
ties of the religious associations to which they 
belong should be stopped by law in order to pro-
tect the dignity and rights of religious citizens and 
to prevent the exhibitions of hatred in speeches 
against them. This position is expressed in the 
document “The attitude of the Russian Orthodox 
Church to publicly deliberate blasphemy and slan-
der against the Church”, which was adopted in 
2011.40 in this context, it seems important to note 
that the european court of human Rights, in 
practice, does not accept that for example ethnic 
minorities should have special rights, but accepts 
the right to preserve ethnic identity as an element 
of human dignity. it seems that the same approach 
could be applied to freedom of expression and 
religious freedom.
over the last few years in europe, we have often 
witnessed public regular performances and other 
38. Group of eminent Persons of the council of europe, 
Living together. Combining diversity and freedom in 
21st-century Europe, strasbourg, 2011.
39. ibid., p. 36.
40. Russian orthodox church, The attitude of the Russian 
Orthodox Church to publicly deliberate blasphemy and 
slander against the Church, Moscow, 2011, availiable at: 
http://mospat.ru/en/documents/otnoshenie-russkojj-
pravoslavnojj-cerkvi-k-namerennomu-publichnomu-
bogokhulstvu-i-klevete-v-adres-cerkvi/
actions which have targeted religious communi-
ties with various forms of aggressive, humiliating 
and offensive behavior. such events have taken 
place time and again in France, italy, spain, nor-
way, Russia and other countries. The point is not 
the existence of mass media, or organizations or 
institutions which are anti-religious, or critical of 
religious organizations or religious teachings. This 
kind of realization of freedom of conscience has 
long been present in europe. There is a new wave 
of what we consider to be an invasion into pre-
cisely the private space of believers which should 
be protected by laws on freedom of conscience. 
The objects of this violation include religious sym-
bols installed in public places, buildings of wor-
ship, religious cemeteries and holy places. For 
many religious citizens in european countries, 
religious life is integral to their individual dignity. 
When the private space of believers is violated by 
someone in order to impose a political position or 
commit actions which insult or humiliate believ-
ers’ dignity, it is no longer freedom of speech or 
self-expression. it is an elementary violation of the 
rights of believers.
in relation to the methods used by religious orga-
nizations to promote their positions in society, 
there can also be very different forms: from spiri-
tual practices, argumentation and social work to 
extremism and terrorism. according to the Rus-
sian church’s Social Doctrine, the most radical 
civil method permitted is that of “disobedience” 
in case of “an indisputable violation committed by 
society or state against the statutes and command-
ments of God” (iV.9). it is beyond the church’s 
duties to prepare revolutions or to take over politi-
cal power.
in these new circumstances, religious freedom 
remains a very important value, but at the same 
time is very fragile; this is why it needs to be pro-
tected in the consideration of new challenges.
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rethinking 
religious freedom
elizabeth shakMan huRD41
I. The ‘first freedom’42
like a good movie, the story of international reli-
gious freedom offers something for everyone. it 
is a battle between cowardly oppressors and the 
undaunted and heroic saviors of the downtrod-
den.43 it is a story of the triumph of international 
law and the policing of those who fail to adhere 
to global norms and standards.44 it is a story of 
the secular tolerance of plural beliefs as a remedy 
for religious beliefs that would otherwise lead to 
violence.45 and today especially, it is a story of the 
need for the u.s. government and others to “con-
vince” people in other countries—and particu-
larly Muslims—that they should endorse a model, 
41. associate Professor Department of Political science, 
northwestern university. co-organizer: “Politics of 
Religious Freedom: contested norms and local Prac-
tices”, eshurd@northwestern.edu
42. This working paper draws on my book manuscript The 
Secular Establishment: Religion, Law and Authority in 
International Politics (in progress), and on e.s. hurd, 
‘believing in religious freedom,’ The Immanent Frame 
(March 1, 2012). http://bit.ly/wqmRWt. That post is 
part a series, guest edited by Winnifred Fallers sul-
livan and myself, in conjunction with a joint research 
project on religious freedom. The series (http://blogs.
ssrc.org/tif/the-politics-of-religious-freedom/) con-
siders the multiple histories and genealogies of reli-
gious freedom—and the multiple contexts in which 
those histories and genealogies are salient today.
43. see http://www.opendoorsusa.org
44. see http://www.uscirf.gov
45. see http://www.tonyblairfaithfoundation.org
the model, of religious liberty as a template for 
organizing and democratizing their politics and 
societies.46 it is also a story of human progress 
and emancipation, of transforming conditions of 
religious oppression to liberate individuals—par-
ticularly women—from their primitive, discrimi-
natory ways. Working alone and in tandem, these 
narratives justify intervention to save, shape, and 
sanctify individual and collective lives.
a rapidly escalating number of actors are promot-
ing religious freedom across state borders. There is 
great excitement about the potential of formaliz-
ing and bureaucratizing religious freedom. legal 
guarantees of religious freedom are embedded as 
riders in trade agreements, in aid packages, and 
in humanitarian projects around the world. The 
european union (eu) is promoting religious free-
dom in its external affairs programming, adding 
clauses to trade agreements with north african 
and central asian trading partners that guaran-
tee a commitment to religious freedom. in brus-
sels, initiatives to train eu diplomats in religious 
freedom promotion are in the works, and the eu 
is drafting official guidelines the subject. at the 
un, the human Rights office (ohchR) is in its 
third decade of promoting religious freedom, and 
recently initiated a campaign to combat incite-
ment to religious hatred. 
 state foreign policy establishments are also pro-
moting religious freedom. The most recent exam-
ple is canada, where Prime Minister harper 
announced in spring 2011 that his government 
intends to create an office of Religious Freedom 
at the Department of Foreign affairs and interna-
tional trade (DFait), modeled on the american 
office in the state Department that has been pro-
moting religious freedom abroad for 14 years. in 
the us religious freedom is described as the “first 
freedom,” a fundamental human right, and a sine 
46. see Thomas F. Farr, “Religious Freedom abroad,” First 
Things (March 2012): 21-23.
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qua non of modern democratic politics, if not of 
civilization itself. americans, we are told, invented 
and perfected religious freedom. americans are so 
devoted to religious freedom that we have become 
official evangelists on its behalf. The international 
Religious Freedom act of 1998 established a state 
Department office of international Religious 
Freedom, which prepares an annual report on the 
status of religious freedom in every country in the 
world except the us, along with a bipartisan over-
sight committee called the commission on inter-
national Religious Freedom. a recent tweet from 
hillary clinton—a real one, not the spoof “texts 
from hillary”-described religious freedom as “a 
bedrock priority of our foreign policy.”
The promotion of religious freedom is ubiquitous. 
and it is not only evangelicals. an impressive 
array of institutions and public authorities across 
the political spectrum, both secular and religious, 
has taken up the cause. like human rights, reli-
gious freedom stands in for the good and the right 
in many difficult and often violent situations. in all 
of the excitement surrounding religious freedom 
as a universal norm—who can be against religious 
freedom?—it is easy to forget that these are politi-
cal projects, situated in history, and implemented 
by powerful state and international authorities. it 
is easy to be swept up in the common sense that 
guaranteeing religious freedom is what keeps at 
bay pre-modern political orders based on tyranni-
cal forms of religious authority that leave women 
and minorities in the dust. When religious free-
dom is positioned as the antidote to such unap-
pealing options, it is not surprising that it has 
gathered so much momentum. 
as the european union and others stand poised 
to join the religious freedom bandwagon, however, 
there is a need to step back from the excitement 
and the anxiety surrounding the international 
promotion of religious freedom. The promotion of 
religious freedom is not simply about the spread of 
a beneficent universal norm and legal standard. it 
is a site of politics, and it is a site of religious poli-
tics. This paper will argue that religious freedom 
advocacy—and religious freedom as a discursive 
frame that is used to orient action in the world—
actively politicizes religious difference, masks 
complex political realities on the ground, and 
obscures mixed and multiform religious realities 
as they are lived and experienced. The legalization 
and top-down promotion of religious freedom 
helps to create a world in which official religious 
difference becomes more salient politically, not 
less. it draws lines between communities, hori-
zontally and hierarchically. it helps to define what 
it means to be religious, and to be free. 
The promotion of religious freedom shapes and 
constrains political realities, and religious pos-
sibilities, on the ground. it obscures local ways 
of living with religious difference. This leads to 
a question: what would it look like to be skepti-
cal of the promise of religious freedom, while also 
strongly opposing all forms of religious persecu-
tion and other forms of injustice and domination?
but why even be skeptical? how can anyone object 
to official promotion of religious freedom when 
religious minorities suffer so much official persecu-
tion? in Maspero last october, the egyptian military 
establishment attacked peaceful protesters demand-
ing rights for coptic christian citizens. at least 25 
were killed and 300 injured. Deplorable oppression 
and murder are suffered by the Rohingya, a Mus-
lim people living in the state of Rakhine in western 
Myanmar, who are denied rights or legal represen-
tation by their government. Governments in saudi 
arabia and bahrain, where the arab spring was 
never allowed to get off the ground, repress local 
shi’a minorities on a daily basis. 
These groups deserve international and local 
support, but not in the guise of religious freedom 
promotion.
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When the united states uses its authority to pro-
mote religious freedom, the government is weigh-
ing in on which forms of religion should be legally 
protected. The us sets standards that effectively 
bolster the sects, denominations, and religious 
authorities that it has defined as authentic and 
benevolent, while marginalizing less desirable 
counterparts. This does not solve the complex 
challenges posed by everyday life in religiously 
diverse societies. Rather, in practice, outsider pro-
motion of religious freedom turns religion into 
a matter for law and politics. instead of calming 
tensions, it hardens lines of division between com-
munities by enforcing the interests of particular 
groups defined in religious terms. The current cri-
sis in syria is an example.
II. Crisis in Syria
calls for the protection of persecuted christians 
in syria and around the Middle east have been a 
cornerstone of us-based religious freedom advo-
cacy in the wake of the uprisings. Joe eibner of 
christian solidarity international has lobbied 
President obama to urge ban ki-moon to declare 
a genocide warning for christians across the Mid-
dle east. howard berman of the house Foreign 
affairs committee says that the future of minori-
ties is “on our agenda as we figure out how to help 
these countries” and their treatment of christians 
and other minorities is a “‘red line’ that will affect 
future aid.” habib Malik of lebanese ameri-
can university calls for Western nations to stand 
up for the rights of christians, who he says may 
be cleansed from lands where democratic elec-
tions are used to oppress minorities rather than 
empower them. While this must be done “in a 
way that is not misperceived on the other end,” 
Malik says, “the West should not be cowed.” USA 
Today reports that according to christian rights 
groups, “christians in syria, where Muslims have 
risen up against President bashar assad, have 
been subjected to murder, rape and kidnappings 
in Damascus and rebellious towns.”47
The momentum builds. The apparent logic of 
the story is clear: when “Muslims rise up against 
assad,” (in other words, when the Muslim-major-
ity populations of the Middle east are left to their 
own devices and no longer repressed by secular 
autocrats), the result is christian persecution. but 
the problem is that the syrian protests are not cap-
tured by the notion of “Muslims rising up against 
assad.” This is how the regime wants us to see the 
story. For decades, the assads have relied on the 
threat of sectarian anarchy lurking just below the 
surface to justify their autocratic rule. When reli-
gious freedom advocates, the media, government 
officials and other public figures reinforce the 
regime’s framing of the war as a sectarian conflict 
pitting sunnis against alawites and their shiite 
allies, it makes sectarian violence more likely. it 
energizes divides between christian, alawite and 
sunni. it brings these identities to the surface, 
accentuates, and aggravates them. When religious 
difference becomes the primary lens through 
which this complex social, economic and politi-
cal conflict is framed, sectarian conflict worsens. 
categories of religious difference (christian, ala-
wite, sunni) that might not otherwise necessarily 
define what began as a popular uprising against a 
secular autocracy become newly salient. 
Many syrians, like people everywhere, hold multi-
ple allegiances, celebrate diverse traditions, are of 
mixed backgrounds, and do not fit into the rubrics 
of religious identity marketed by religious freedom 
advocates. left out in the cold, these ‘in-between’ 
individuals find themselves in the impossible 
position of having to make political claims on reli-
gious grounds, or having no grounds from which 
to speak.48 This situation pressures dissenters, 
47. http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/story/2012-
01-30/arab-spring-christians/52894182/1
48. elizabeth a. castelli, “Theologizing human Rights: 
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doubters, and families that include multiple reli-
gious affiliations to choose a side and define their 
identities in religious terms: “are you this or are 
you that?” in emphasizing these differences, reli-
gious freedom advocacy activates and politicizes 
religious difference. it also systematically ignores 
the widespread existence of anti-assad alawites 
and syrians who do not identify with a single reli-
gious tradition.
in syria, then, religious freedom promotion adds 
fuel to the fire of the very sectarian conflict that 
religious freedom claims to be uniquely equipped 
to transcend. it also masks complex political and 
religious realities on the ground. to suggest that 
the conflict stems from a failure to acknowledge 
the rights of certain believers conceals the ways in 
which social divisions cut across sectarian divides. 
it obscures the ways forward when the focus is 
not on beliefs or communities of believers, but on 
shared human needs and visions. 
of course, the mobilization of the logic of sectari-
anism for political ends extends far beyond syria, 
and exceeds the language of religious freedom. 
For example, this logic has come to dominate 
media coverage of the uprising in bahrain, where 
an embattled regime, challenged by both shi’a and 
sunni dissenters, has largely succeeded in fram-
ing the conflict as sectarian by mobilizing sunni 
against shi’a on the claim that the latter are con-
trolled by a predatory iran.49 as Joost hiltermann 
argues, “by whipping up sectarian sentiments, the 
[bahraini] government hopes to change the per-
ception of the conflict from one that pits a popular 
pro-democracy movement against an authoritar-
christian activism and the limits of Religious Free-
dom,” in Michel Feher with Gaëlle krikorian and 
yates Mckee, eds. Non-Governmental Politics (new 
york: zone books, 2007), p. 684.
49. Joost hiltermann, “bahrain: a new sectarian con-
flict?” The New York Review of Books Blog (May 8, 
2012). hiltermann observes that, “sunni-shia interac-
tion is what defines daily life at the workplace and in 
many neighborhoods.”
ian regime to one of a sectarian struggle between 
sunni and shia, with the strong government 
needed to maintain order.”50 Religious freedom 
taps into and feeds this logic, but it does not gen-
erate it by itself. it is part of a broader complex.
My point is that in syria, bahrain and elsewhere, 
the complex histories, experiences and uncertain-
ties that shape religious identification cannot be 
squeezed into the rigid categories imposed by 
the logic of religious freedom. They just don’t fit. 
Recent scholarship in the study of religion is help-
ful in developing this point. as noah salomon 
and Jeremy Walton write:
What makes someone a believer or a mem-
ber of a faith community and what makes 
someone not so? What life experiences, con-
fessional commitments, and ritual practices 
qualify one as an insider, and which prohibit 
an individual from inclusion? Are ‘insider’ 
and ‘outsider’ categories that we must inhabit 
permanent or can we move creatively between 
them? Most importantly, should scholars [or 
governments?] attempt to adjudicate these 
questions of religious identity and belonging, 
thereby becoming arbiters of orthodoxy?51
salomon and Walton point to the complexities of 
religious affiliation and practice. They explain the 
difficulties of assigning individuals to the cate-
gory of believer or non-believer. They speak of the 
structures of power—what they call the ‘arbiters 
of orthodoxy’—that are implicated in deciding 
who is officially in, and who’s out. 
The logic of religious freedom, on the other hand, 
does not question the power of established author-
50. ibid.
51. noah salomon and Jeremy F. Walton, “Religious 
criticism, secular criticism, and the ‘critical study of 
religion’: lessons from the study of islam,” in Robert 
a. orsi (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Religious 
Studies (cambridge: cambridge university Press, 
2012), p. 406.
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ities to make these designations. it does not inter-
rogate the ability and willingness of individuals 
to live according to them. instead, these projects 
funnel people into one community or another, 
authorizing and relying on boundaries that might 
not otherwise have enjoyed as much political trac-
tion. Families with multiple religious affiliations 
under the same roof must choose a side when 
religious identity is politicized. For example, the 
syrian child of a mixed marriage between a sunni 
and an alawite is pressured to choose between the 
two identities because officially promoted “reli-
gious freedom” leaves so little room to be both. 
identity takes on an exclusivist religious tinge: 
“are you this or are you that?” 
This aggravates sectarian tensions, drawing a line 
under one’s religious identity as the factor that 
trumps others. being a christian or a Muslim 
becomes more important than being pro- or anti-
regime. We saw these dynamics in bosnia in the 
1990s, when people who described themselves as 
atheists before the war suddenly woke up to find 
themselves identified publically and politically by 
a newly salient religious identity. This also brings 
to mind the old joke about the tourist in belfast 
who, asked by a local whether he was catholic or 
Protestant, stated that he was atheist. “but are you 
a catholic atheist or a Protestant atheist?” queried 
the local.
III. Whose religion? Whose 
freedom?
by promoting official religious identities, the us 
state Department and its kin discount the pos-
sibility of mixed, blurred, indistinct religious 
identities and, in so doing, help perpetuate the 
very conflicts they claim to resolve. in the pro-
cess, Western governments are also deciding what 
counts as religion (as opposed to tradition, culture 
or superstition, for example), and which forms 
of religion should be legally protected. Religion 
requires protection, but superstition does not. 
For instance, the 2010 state Department’s Report 
on the central african Republic notes that as 
many as 60 percent of the imprisoned women 
in the country had been charged with “witch-
craft,” which the government considers a criminal 
offense—and yet concludes that the government 
“generally respected religious freedom in prac-
tice” in caR, and gives the country a good rank-
ing overall.52 
This model of religious freedom has no room for 
african traditional Religions (atRs, in the jar-
gon) like this one. Women imprisoned for witch-
craft cannot suffer from violations of religious 
freedom because, in Western eyes, they have no 
religion. atRs fall out of the picture when reli-
gious freedom comes to town. Practitioners lan-
guish in jail as a result. 
but the problem runs still deeper. The process of 
legally defining religious freedom also transforms 
religion itself. The urge to locate individuals in 
single faith communities makes religious life hard 
for people who identify with several traditions, 
or perhaps none at all, leading to polarization 
between traditions in the place of hybrid religious 
practice. as noah salomon, an expert on sudan, 
describes the situation there: “to think of such 
‘traditional’ practices as distinct confessions does 
not represent the reality of south sudanese who 
may identify as christians and at the same time 
see no contradiction in maintaining these rites 
and rituals.”53 in other words, the religious lives 
of people who practice multiple traditions are ren-
dered illegible by the logic of religious freedom, 
even as official religions gain newfound political 
standing. in the new south sudan, the govern-
ment’s bureau of Religious affairs registers “Faith-
based organizations,” rejecting those christian 
52. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148671.htm
53. noah salomon, “Freeing religion at the birth of south 
sudan,” The Immanent Frame, april 12, 2012, available 
at: http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/04/12/freeing-religion-
at-the-birth-of-south-sudan/
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organizations whose constitutions “do not line up 
with biblical chapters or verses,” according to an 
inspector in the bureau interviewed by salomon.
and there’s the rub. in these circumstances it is 
far too easy for the religion of the majority, the 
religion of those in power, or the particular ver-
sion of a religion supported by the us or other 
power brokers to carry more weight, politically, 
than others. This is occurring in south sudan, as 
groups that the south sudanese government disfa-
vors are classified as ‘cults’ while others are regis-
tered and protected as orthodox.
This suggests a different perspective on official 
us religious freedom promotion efforts, and 
potentially those of the eu as well. let’s call these 
efforts what they are: political and religious strat-
egies to promote us interests--and, since 9/11 if 
not before, weapons in the ‘war on terror.’ Mod-
eled on us cold War efforts to combat secularism 
and communism by promoting ‘global spiritual 
health,’ the office of Religious Freedom is part of 
a us effort to break off moderate Muslims from 
hard-core islamists overseas. The government 
intervenes in the complex religious landscapes of 
other countries to identify the kind of religion that 
aligns with us interests. That religion is bolstered. 
That religion is freed—or coopted. For instance, 
as The New York Times has reported, in 2005 the 
Pentagon paid the lincoln Group to “identify reli-
gious leaders who could help produce messages 
that would persuade sunnis in violence-ridden 
anbar Province to participate in national elections 
and reject the insurgency.” 54 That’s not religious 
freedom. That’s the u.s. government promoting a 
particular set of policy options in another coun-
try, using religion as its cloak.
americans are proud of the concept of religious 
freedom. questioning the concept makes one 
54. David s. cloud, & Jeff Gerth, “Muslim scholars Were 
Paid to aid u.s. Propaganda,” The New York Times 
(January 2, 2006).
vulnerable to accusations of defiling something 
sacred. The us office reassures americans that the 
us is and will remain the leader of a religiously 
free world. it allows americans to feel morally 
superior to benighted and oppressed foreigners at 
a time of economic uncertainty. it deflects atten-
tion from suffering religious minorities at home, 
such as the victims of the massacre at a sikh tem-
ple near Milwaukee in august 2012, and other 
domestic casualties of the ‘war on terror.’55 and it 
fits with a widely held, if rarely discussed, tenet 
among us foreign policy-makers: promoting us 
secular national security interests often requires 
the us to socially engineer religious affairs abroad.
some will defend this religious interventionism in 
the name of national security and the war on ter-
ror, human rights, or both. This now, apparently, 
includes many europeans. 
but is this really—and could it ever be—about 
religious freedom? 
is religious freedom something that can be pro-
moted by powerful arbiters of orthodoxy, whether 
religious or political? if not, then what are all these 
authorities promoting? in whose name do they 
speak? are those empowered by the spread of reli-
gious freedom capable of assessing and judging the 
lives of those they seek to redeem?56 is it possible to 
respond to the seemingly unstoppable onslaught 
of religious freedom in the name of alternate ways 
of being religious, and being human, now being 
swept away, ironically, by a single-minded focus 
on religious freedom?
55. The day after the shootings in Wisconsin a mosque 
in Joplin, Missouri was burned to the ground. http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/us/if-the-sikh-temple-
had-been-a-muslim-mosque-on-religion.html?_r=0
56. lila abu-lughod, “anthropology in the territory of 
Rights, islamic, human, and otherwise . . .” Proceed-
ings of the British Academy 167 (2010), p. 255.
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The politics 
of religious 
Freedom: 
competing claims 
in the United 
states (and other 
places)
t. JeReMy Gunn57
Introduction
in his most famous work, Walden; Or, Life in 
the Woods, henry David Thoreau wrote that “i 
should not talk so much about myself if there 
were anybody else whom i knew so well.”58 in this 
Thoreavian spirit, i will largely focus on my own 
experiences with regard to the “politics of reli-
gious freedom” not because of any importance 
of myself, but because they are the experiences 
that i know best.59 i will secondarily focus on the 
57. associate Professor, school of humanities and social 
sciences, al akhawayn university
58. henry David Thoreau, Walden and Civil Disobedience 
(new york: barnes & noble classics, 2003), p. 7. 
59. For an earlier treatment of many of the following 
issues, see t. Jeremy Gunn, “The united states and 
the Promotion of Freedom of Religion and belief,” in 
Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook, 
tore lindholm, et al., eds. (leiden: Martinus nijhoff 
Publishers, 2004), pp. 721-46.
united states, not because it is the most impor-
tant country in the world with regard to the poli-
tics of promoting religious freedom internation-
ally (though i believe that it is) nor because it has 
done the most good (which may or may not be the 
case), but because it too is the country i know best. 
i should also add, from the beginning, that i do 
not attribute any failings in how the united states 
handles the intersection of religion and politics to 
any peculiar characteristics of the american peo-
ple, to the makeup of their Dna, nor chemicals 
in american water (though there are many), but 
rather to failings that can be found more generally 
with human beings throughout the world who use 
religion to advance political beliefs.
I. The Politics of Religious 
Freedom
Religious freedom, and the politics of religious 
freedom, was largely absent from the international 
agenda prior to the late 1990s. i personally was 
involved with u.s. constitutional law regarding 
religion both academically (the topic of my Ph.D. 
dissertation) and professionally (as an attorney in 
pro bono cases) in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
My first encounter with religious freedom as an 
international subject came in the early 1990s when 
i received a query as to whether i might be willing 
to represent the bulgarian orthodox church in a 
case before the european court of human Rights. 
Though i had no international human rights 
experience, i thought that this was an opportu-
nity i should not miss. i began looking for the first 
time into decisions of the european court and the 
european commission on human Rights, and 
started my historical inquiry into the situation of 
the bulgarian church. a few weeks later, when i 
learned that the church would be interested in 
my representing them only if i could guarantee a 
victory, my enthusiasm dissipated and i guaran-
teed the church only that i could not guarantee a 
victory. but my interest in the international law of 
religious freedom had been piqued.
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My preliminary research forays into international 
freedom of religion or belief in the early 1990s 
were not encouraging. i learned, for example, that 
amnesty international and human Rights Watch 
did not have any particular interest in religion. 
amnesty international seemed to report on reli-
gion only incidentally when another issue was 
present, such as when a catholic priest in latin 
america had been arrested for opposing govern-
mental corruption. i was, frankly, dismayed to 
learn that the european court of human Rights 
had issued no decision interpreting article 9 of 
the 1950 european convention on human Rights, 
and every decision of the european commission 
on article 9 had held that there was no viola-
tion of the rights of freedom of religion or belief. 
The absence of nGo interest in the issue and the 
absence of action from the united nations and the 
council of europe did not suggest to me that all 
was well in the world, but that the issue was not 
being taken sufficiently seriously. 
in 1993, finally, the european court issued its 
first article 9 decision, Kokkinakis v. Greece.60 
although kokkinakis, a Jehovah’s Witness, won 
his religious freedom case overturning his con-
viction for the crime of proselytism, the decision 
of the european court was based not upon the 
robust grounds that preaching one’s religion to 
an adult cannot possibly be a crime, but on the 
rather limited grounds that the Greek state pros-
ecutor had failed to prove all of the elements of the 
“crime of proselytism.” in that same year, 1993, 
the u.n. committee on human Rights issued its 
first guidance on interpreting art. 18 of the inter-
national covenant on civil and Political Rights 
(General comment 22).61 it was as if the human 
rights world was slowly, yet haltingly, awakening.
60. kokkinakis v. Greece, ecthR, 25/5/1993, (14307/88).
61. General comment no. 22: The right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion (art. 18): 07/30/1993. 
ccPR/c/21/Rev.1/add.4, General comment no. 22. 
(General comments).
i attended the 1993 World conference on human 
Rights in Vienna and i participated in the small 
nGo session on freedom of religion. it was there 
that i first met several future colleagues – includ-
ing the omnipresent cole Durham – for the first 
time. bahia tahzib was the rapporteur for the ses-
sion and was then working on her doctoral disser-
tation on the united nations and freedom of reli-
gion or belief (subsequently published in 1996).62 
Johan van der Vyver was there from emory uni-
versity and he announced that he and John Witte 
were preparing a conference (ultimately held in 
october 1994) that led to the publication of a two-
volume work in 1996.63 i wrote a chapter for that 
work on the freedom of religion or belief within 
the european human rights system.64 at that that 
time it is was very difficult to obtain decisions of 
the european commission on human Rights, and 
i even made a trip to the council of europe library 
in strasbourg so that i could make sure that i 
found them all. (My study was, to the best of my 
knowledge, the first comprehensive review of all 
decisions regarding religion from the court and 
commission). i argued that the european court 
and european commission had largely failed to 
take religious freedom seriously.
in 1996, the organization for security and coop-
eration in europe (osce) held in Warsaw, Poland, 
its first seminar (i.e., conference) on the freedom 
of religion or belief entitled “constitutional, 
legal and administrative aspects of Freedom of 
62. bahiyyih G. tahzib, Freedom of Religion or Belief: 
Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection, (The 
hague: Martinus nijhoff Publishers, 1996).
63. see Johan D. van der Vyver and John Witte, Jr., eds., 
Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective, 2 vols. 
(The hague: Martinus nijhoff Publishers, 1996).
64. t. Jeremy Gunn, “adjudicating Rights of conscience 
under the european convention on human Rights,” 
in Johan D. van der Vyver and John Witte, Jr., eds., 
Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective, (legal 
Perspectives), (The hague: Martinus nijhoff Publish-
ers, 1996), pp. 305-330.
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Religion.”65 The following year the osce estab-
lished a Panel of experts to give ongoing guidance 
on the issue to osce participating states. since 
that time, religion and belief has become a regular 
part of the osce activities. The issue of freedom 
of religion or belief was, gradually, becoming a 
part of the international agenda. 
II. The role of the United 
States
Prior to 1996, the united states played only a mod-
est role in the promotion of freedom of religion 
internationally. in 1986, it had been, for example, 
one of the countries to sponsor the creation of the 
position of u.n. special Rapporteur on religious 
intolerance (now the u.n. special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Religion or belief). The united states 
had supported cases of religious freedom involv-
ing the soviet union and Warsaw Pact countries. 
it had led a movement to “free soviet Jewry” in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Public pressure ultimately 
contributed to the u.s. congress enacting the 
so-called “Jackson-Vanik amendment” in 1974, 
which was designed to apply sanctions to the 
soviet union if it did not open its emigration poli-
cies to Jews. The united states began publishing 
annual reports on human rights in 1978 that mod-
estly included religious freedom issues, though the 
first reports were rather sketchy. The first country 
report on saudi arabia contained only one sen-
tence: “islam is the established religion of saudi 
arabia and saudis are not permitted to practice 
other religions, although non-Muslim foreigners 
have been able to hold private and discreet reli-
gious services.”66
65. t. Jeremy Gunn, “The united states and the Promo-
tion of Freedom of Religion and belief”, see supra at 
59, p. 726. 
66. u.s. Department of state, Report submitted to the 
committee on international Relations u.s. house of 
Representatives and committee on Foreign Relations 
(Washington, D.c.: u.s. Government Printing office, 
1978), 404.
in 1996, during the first clinton administra-
tion (1993-1997), a collection of conservative 
activists held a conference under the auspices of 
Freedom house entitled “Global Persecution of 
christians.”67 The conference led to the develop-
ment of a movement that drew attention to the 
persecution of christians in the world. The follow-
ing year, people associated with this conference 
encouraged the u.s. congress to enact legislation 
that would require the u.s. government to take 
steps to put pressure on countries that persecute 
christians. over time, the proposed legislation 
expanded somewhat beyond the persecution of 
christians, with the emphasis nevertheless focus-
ing on persecution by Muslim-majority countries 
and communist countries (particularly china). a 
bill entitled the “Freedom from Religious Perse-
cution act” (generally known as “Wolf-specter” 
following the names of its legislative sponsors) 
was introduced in 1997 that reflected an emphasis 
on imposing sanctions against states that toler-
ated persecution of specified groups (particularly 
christians and tibetan buddhists).68 This so-
called Wolf-specter bill did not propose “neutral” 
criteria for identifying persecution against any 
religion, but was focused instead on the nature of 
the regime of the country engaged in persecuting 
(communist or Muslim-majority) and the groups 
that were particularly subject to abuse (chris-
tians and tibetan buddhists). The bill proposed 
that automatic sanctions be imposed on countries 
once their abuses had been identified.
While the Wolf-specter bill was slowly working its 
way through the legislative process, an alternate 
bill named the “international Religious Freedom 
act” was being drafted in the senate.69 its focus 
was less on identifying specific countries involved 
67. t. Jeremy Gunn, “The united states and the Promo-
tion of Freedom of Religion and belief,” see supra at 
59, p. 727.
68. ibid., 728-29.
69. ibid., 729-30.
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in persecution or particular groups suffering from 
persecution, introducing instead relatively neutral 
criteria for identifying both persecuting coun-
tries as well as persecuted groups. it also proposed 
a range of responses that might be taken by the 
u.s. government when it found religious persecu-
tion. The responses proposed by the draft senate 
bill ranged from issuing a diplomatic demarche 
to imposing economic sanctions. The senate bill 
ultimately included a provision that created an 
independent agency named the u.s. commission 
on international Religious Freedom (usciRF). 
after a difficult and often antagonistic legisla-
tive process, the senate bill was finally adopted, 
unanimously, by both the senate and the house 
of Representatives as the international Religious 
Freedom act of 1998 (iRFa).70 President clinton 
immediately signed the bill into law.
i worked at the office of international Religious 
Freedom at the u.s. Department of state during 
the time that iRFa was being negotiated and dur-
ing its first year of implementation. i subsequently 
worked for one year – before resigning in protest 
because of the politicization of issues – as the 
Director of Research at the usciRF. although 
i played no role in the legislative process, i was 
involved in the implementation of iRFa both at 
the state Department and at usciRF.
in my opinion, most of the individuals in the state 
Department and usciRF who were involved in 
implementing the law and in promoting interna-
tionally the freedom of religion and belief were 
serious, well-meaning, committed, and reasonably 
objective in how they conducted their research 
and how they attempted to implement iRFa. i 
will offer below some counterexamples to illus-
trate some of the problems. in identifying these 
counterexamples i would like to be clear that, in 
70. The international Religious Freedom act of 1998, 22 
usc 6401 (Public law no. 105-292 112 state 2787) 
(subsequently amended).
my opinion, they were exceptions to the rule, but 
they were important and significant exceptions. 
They reveal, in my opinion, just how easy it was to 
politicize “religious freedom.”
First, in my opinion, one of the important motiva-
tions behind the iRFa legislation and the under-
lying interest in promoting freedom of religion in 
the late 1990s was the partisan effort by some con-
servative Republicans to undermine politically the 
position of President clinton. The Wolf-specter 
and iRFa legislation were being debated at exactly 
the same time that the Republican-dominated 
congress was investigating President clinton on 
several issues, including most notably the Mon-
ica lewinsky scandal. Many Republicans were 
searching for issues on which to attack President 
clinton as he headed toward his campaign for re-
election in 1996. it was decided that the clinton 
administration had been less than active in its sup-
port for religious freedom abroad. in my personal 
opinion this was to some extent true – but not at 
all for the reasons that were advanced. although 
the clinton administration had not placed a pri-
ority on religious freedom internationally, neither 
had any prior american presidential administra-
tion, from George Washington to George h.W. 
bush. indeed, the entire international commu-
nity, as i described above, had not focused on the 
importance of the freedom of religion and belief. 
under mounting pressure from conservatives 
and Republicans in congress, the clinton state 
Department finally began to take the issue more 
seriously during the late 1990s. Thus i believe it 
is fair to say both that the clinton administration 
had not focused on the issue until it was subjected 
to pressure from conservatives, and, at the same 
time, the issue had never galvanized conservatives 
prior to the mid-1990s when they sought a way to 
attack a president whom they did not like for rea-
sons completely unrelated to religious freedom. in 
short, the clinton administration began to take 
the issue seriously because of right-wing political 
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pressure, but the right-wing pressure was a result 
of an “invented” political issue designed to under-
mine a Democratic president.
second, i witnessed a revealing example of the 
partisan politicization of the process while i 
was at the state Department. The new iRFa law 
required President clinton to nominate individu-
als to serve as some of the members of the new 
u.s. commission on international Religious Free-
dom (usciRF). The President (through the sec-
retary of state) reasonably promptly identified the 
potential presidential appointments for the com-
mission. under standard procedures, the poten-
tial presidential nominees were, prior to a public 
announcement, subjected to the standard clearing 
and vetting process. The process was not swift, but 
it had been launched reasonably quickly by the 
clinton administration. While it was underway, 
i heard a “conversation” wherein congressman 
Frank Wolf, a conservative Republican who played 
a significant role in promoting the legislation, 
shouted – i repeat “shouted” – at a state Depart-
ment official condemning the delay in President 
clinton’s nominating of commission members. 
he told that official that he should “resign imme-
diately” because clinton was obviously attempt-
ing to sabotage the new law by maliciously delay-
ing the process. it was not proper at that time for 
the state Department to respond to the irate con-
gressman about the status of potential nominees. 
congressman Wolf, in my judgment, was not 
only overreacting, he lost control of himself and 
made partisan and irrational assumptions based 
upon some type of conspiratorial belief that Presi-
dent clinton was opposed to religious freedom. i 
noted with interest that when President George 
W. bush, a Republican whose political beliefs 
were closer to those of congressman Wolf, took 
almost a year before naming his ambassador for 
international Religious Freedom, that congress-
man Wolf offered no public condemnation of his 
fellow-Republican.
Third, in my opinion, many of the decisions and 
actions of the usciRF during its first term were 
based on american politics rather than a prin-
cipled approach to religious freedom. The parti-
san and ill-informed actions of some commis-
sion members led me to believe that the usciRF 
was doing more harm than good. as a result, i 
resigned my position after its first year. i will give 
a few examples. 
III. The Politicization of 
Religious Freedom
as the Director of Research at usciRF, it was one 
of my responsibilities to oversee the preparation of 
the first draft of the usciRF’s annual report. The 
final draft would be that adopted by the commis-
sion members themselves. in my draft i included 
references to decisions of the european court of 
human Rights (whose decisions, in my opinion, 
were slowly improving). i included such references 
in order to support the position that the united 
states was not promoting internationally its own 
particular constitutional understanding of the 
meaning of religious freedom, but was promoting 
an increasingly accepted international standard. i 
believed it would be more effective to suggest that 
what the united states was promoting was part of 
an international consensus rather than the pecu-
liar and particular beliefs of americans. one of 
the commission members, John bolton – later the 
George W. bush administration’s ambassador to 
the united nations – denounced this particular 
reference in the draft report and demanded that it 
be removed from the commission’s draft. What i 
had intended as a way of suggesting international 
support was attacked because it was international. 
bolton said, in words that i remember distinctly, 
“if Jeremy wants to politicize this report then i 
will go to my friends on capitol hill and we will 
have a fight about it.” (although he did not iden-
tify who his friends were, i assumed that he was 
referring particularly to senator Jesse helms.) i 
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had not intended to politicize the report or the dis-
cussion; bolton in fact politicized it in no uncertain 
terms. The tame reference to the european court of 
human Rights was removed on bolton’s insistence.
similar occurrences took place with regard to the 
draft report on sudan and china. i had intended 
that the draft, which was very critical of the 
governments of sudan and china, nevertheless 
explain the conflicts in a way that attempted to 
explain the positions of those two governments 
before responding to them. i am of the opinion 
that simple denunciations of other governments 
are not particularly effective – and the goal should 
have been to be persuasive. John bolton (again) 
and some other commission members proceeded 
through the draft and slashed and burned what 
one commission member (who happened to 
be a Republican) said was “a sophisticated and 
nuanced” analysis. bolton baldly asserted that 
china’s resistance to western pressures in part 
because of the ugly legacy of european interven-
tions in china, but in his view, because they are 
(and i quote him exactly) “fucking communists.” 
nuance did not prevail; conservative anger tri-
umphed. although i was not present when the 
following action occurred, it was reported to me 
after i had left that when the commission later 
came to discuss the religious-freedom policies of 
united states ally saudi arabia, the same conser-
vatives who wished to attack sudan and china in 
unnuanced terms suddenly came to the position 
that it would be best to moderate any criticism of 
america’s oil-rich ally, saudi arabia. (The usciRF 
later began to condemn saudi arabia.)
Fourth, one u.s. senator whom i had long admired, 
Richard lugar, a Republican of indiana, neverthe-
less fell victim to a double standard. When newly 
elected President barak obama nominated his 
first ambassador for international Religious Free-
dom, senator lugar, then-chairman of the sen-
ate Foreign Relations committee, sent a long list 
of sharp questions to the nominee about what she 
would do about a series of violations of religious 
freedom across the world, from china, to sudan, 
to Vietnam, to laos, to Russia, and elsewhere. The 
clear thrust of his letter was to make sure that she 
would be a valiant promoter of religious freedom 
wherever it might be under threat anywhere in 
the world. by coincidence, at the same time that 
he sent that letter, there was a controversy in new 
york city about the construction of what came to 
be called the “Ground zero Mosque,” even though 
it was not a mosque (it was a community center) 
and it was not at “ground zero” (the location of 
the World trade center), but a few blocks away. 
There was sharp opposition from many parts of 
the american community to Muslims erecting 
such a building near the sacred site where many 
had lost their lives. (in my personal opinion, the 
opposition was principally due to bias and irratio-
nal hostility against islam.) When asked about his 
position on the propriety of erecting the Muslim 
building in new york city, senator lugar – the 
same man who courageously insisted that the 
obama administration promote religious freedom 
throughout the entire world – said that the new 
york facility was a “local decision” and that he had 
no comment.71 he demanded religious freedom 
for chinese christians living in nanjing but not 
for his fellow-americans living in new york city.
Conclusion 
underlying many aspects of this issue, and deserv-
ing of much more nuance than i can provide here, 
is what i believe to be a presumption from part 
of the american community that religious free-
dom should not be understood as being a neutral 
standard to be uniformly applied, but as a tactical 
weapon to be used to advance both religious and 
political agenda. 
71. Greg sargent, “senator lugar won’t take position on 
‘mosque,’ Washington Post, aug. 27, 2010, availiable at: 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/plum-line/2010/08/
senator_lugar_wont_take_positi.html
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supporting 
subversion? 
international 
organisations 
and ‘Freedom of 
conscience’ in 
islamic states
MattheW J. nelson72
if you are a Muslim in negeri sembilan—a state 
in peninsular Malaysia—you may appear before a 
state-level shari‘ah court judge to renounce islam. 
initially, the judge will refer you to an islamic 
Faith Rehabilitation centre for up to three months 
of remedial counseling regarding the fate of your 
soul, your community, and perhaps the state as a 
whole. after this, if you fail to ‘repent’, your case 
will be adjourned for a year. however, if you insist 
on leaving islam even after this year, you will be 
permitted to do so.73 
72. Reader Department of Politics, school of oriental and 
african studies, university of london
73.  islamic law is a state-level (provincial) law in Malay-
sia. in some parts of Malaysia detention in the islamic 
Faith Rehabilitation centre is extended to as much as 
thirty-six months. in other parts detention is followed 
by a fine (and, in one case, six lashes). see Mohamed 
azam Mohamed adil, ‘Restrictions on Freedom of 
Religion in Malaysia: a conceptual analysis with 
special Reference to the law of apostasy’, Muslim 
some see negeri sembilan’s period of mandatory 
counseling as a period of mandatory detention. 
Their concerns often prompt them to favour sin-
gapore’s approach, in which obligatory counseling 
is not combined with any detention. 
occasionally, Muslim scholars insist that such ‘con-
cessions’ to global human rights norms (regard-
ing freedom of religion) should be avoided—that, 
within an islamic state like Malaysia, apostates 
should be killed. others note that ‘there is no 
compulsion in religion’ (including rehabilitative 
detention)—indeed, that islamic states have no 
objection to apostasy so long as it is not combined 
with seditious forms of evangelism targeting the 
constitutional status of islam itself. 
My question is this: is it possible to read negeri 
sembilan’s approach to the regulation  of apostasy 
as part of a wider effort to ‘translate’ global human 
rights norms—in this case, freedom of religion—
into contexts framed by islam? before i address 
this question, i will turn to a second case in which 
shifting ties with religion are read through deeply 
contextualized political lenses.
During the final years of the cold War education 
specialists at the university of nebraska (omaha) 
received u.s. government funding to prepare text-
books for afghan refugee children living in Paki-
stan. training would-be mujahideen to fight the 
soviets, the textbooks were saturated with religious 
content: ‘a’ is for allah; ‘J’ is for Jihad; and so on.74 
after 9/11, u.s. funding poured back into Paki-
stan to support various types of education reform. 
Religious education was a source of particular 
concern, but this time some american officials 
insisted that the u.s. constitution prohibited any 
meddling in religious affairs. u.s. funding could 
be used to buy computers for local schools and 
World Journal of Human Rights 4:2 (2007), 1-24. 
74.  see craig Davis, ‘“a” is for allah, “J” is for Jihad’, 
World Policy Journal 19:1 (2002), pp. 90-94.
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madrasas, but for these officials curricular mat-
ters involving an alternative interpretation of islam 
were off-limits. 
These american debates about the reach of the 
First amendment (abroad) point to a wider strug-
gle regarding the translation of specific principles 
pertaining to ‘official engagements with religion’. 
Does the u.s. constitution’s First amendment 
imply that u.s. officials are allergic to religion (in 
general), or does it imply that u.s. constitutional 
allergies pertain to religious ‘establishment’ within 
the united states? how should u.s. foreign policy 
engagements engage religion without prompting 
concerns about a risk of constitutional subversion 
‘at home’?
The Politics of Subversion 
in Establishment and Non-
Establishment States
Within these two vignettes i perceive a global 
struggle surrounding efforts to translate a univer-
sal freedom of religion within two very different 
types of states, namely, ‘establishment’ and ‘non-
establishment’ states. in both cases the struggle 
unfolds on two levels simultaneously: one con-
cerning apostasy (as a matter of human rights per-
taining to individual belief); the other concerning 
sedition (as a political matter related to the preser-
vation of a particular constitutional order). small 
shifts involving individual actors in Malaysia and 
public funding decisions in the u.s. are often seen 
as the first step on a slippery slope to mass conver-
sion or political subversion. 
When a Muslim in Malaysia leaves islam, some 
argue that he threatens the islamic con-stitutional 
order of Malaysia. (at the very least, some argue 
that he threatens Malaysia’s demographic-cum-
political balance—not unlike a convert in a fragile 
‘consociational’ context like lebanon.) When a u.s. 
government official spends money on ‘islamic’ edu-
cation in Pakistan, some argue that she threatens 
the secular constitutional order of american ‘non-
establishment’. in effect, Malaysian apostates and 
u.s. government funders of islamic education are 
said to be engage in transgressive political acts with 
allegedly existential (constitutional) implications. 
The key issue concerns the link between efforts to 
engage religion (or leave it) and the protection of 
a given constitutional order. Why does the ‘estab-
lished’ islamic state of Malaysia care whether the 
Muslims living within its borders leave islam? 
Why does the ‘non-established’ constitution of the 
united states care whether its President spends 
money in support of religious actors abroad? it is 
not difficult to see that, in Malaysia and the u.s., 
the issue of religious affiliation is closely tied to 
concerns about political subversion. indeed, only 
the most naïve human rights observers are pre-
pared to suggest that apostasy is actually limited 
to simple questions of private freedom.
For centuries, Muslim scholars have been par-
ticularly astute in tying questions of conscience 
to questions of political order. They have noted, 
in particular, that, when it comes to questions 
of conscience, the question is never ‘how should 
freedom be protected as an absolute value’, but 
rather, focusing on the shifting interplay of com-
peting domestic forces (often in collaboration with 
various allies abroad), ‘how should freedom of 
conscience be regulated as an expression of con-
stitutional control’?75
some argue that would-be apostates must be 
‘monitored’ to prevent destabilizing forms of con-
version. More relaxed observers argue that con-
sciences should be free to roam so long as the pre-
vailing constitutional order—say, establishment 
or non-establishment—is preserved. in fact these 
75. Frank Griffel, ‘toleration and exclusion: al-shafi’i 
and al-Ghazali on the treatment  of apostates’, Bul-
letin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 84:3 
(2001), pp. 339-354.
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two options work together: small shifts involv-
ing individual apostates and tiny adjustments in 
funding for actors abroad are often monitored in 
a bid to protect (or advance) a particular constitu-
tional order.
The question is: What is the process whereby indi-
vidual freedom might be protected, as a universal 
value, within both ‘establishment’ and ‘non-estab-
lishment’ contexts?
indeed, returning to the question i posed at the 
outset: Would it be fair to say that negeri sembi-
lan’s Faith Rehabilitation centres combine inter-
national support for individual freedom of con-
science with a clear acknowledgment of ‘sovereign’ 
constitutional orders? and, turning to the u.s., 
could the u.s. government endorse these centres 
without, at the same time, violating its own com-
mitment to ‘domestic’ non-establishment?
These are the questions that interest me: What 
does it mean for u.s. officials to protect ‘freedom 
of religion’ abroad (for example, with reference 
to Malaysia) while, at the same time, noting that 
‘non-establishment’ is not a universal constitu-
tional principle? What are the issues that ‘inter-
national’ efforts to protect freedom of conscience 
should consider within an explicitly ‘islamic’ 
state? indeed, turning to Malaysia, how should 
an explicitly ‘islamic’ state deal with ‘freedom of 
conscience’ in a set of domestic laws (regarding 
subversion) that are, nevertheless, influenced by 
international human rights norms? how should 
Malaysia ‘translate’ its commitment to religious 
establishment when speaking with its interna-
tional partners? 
if, properly understood, both establishment and 
non-establishment boil down to dom-estic con-
stitutional orders that address the relationship 
between religion and sedition, how do they travel 
abroad? 
‘International’ Americans in 
‘Muslim’ Asia 
This past september i was in kuala lumpur 
attending a workshop led by an american organ-
isation that funds governance and development 
projects in asia. The workshop sought to chart 
the future of an innovative human rights and 
development programme working with Muslim 
religious leaders in various asian countries. Dur-
ing the workshop two issues broadly related to the 
themes of this brief essay stood out. 
The first issue concerned the value of working 
with religious leaders—in this case, thousands of 
mullahs—to enhance the organisation’s access to 
local communities and, thus, to improve its abil-
ity to deliver various projects related to the rights 
of women. (The organisation acknowledged that, 
over the years, its close relationships with secu-
lar human rights organizations, including many 
feminist organizations, had tied it to a smaller and 
smaller proportion of the local population. in fact, 
by engaging local mullahs, the organisation explic-
itly hoped to correct its expanding lack of access.)
even as its work with local mullahs expanded, 
however, its relations with donor agencies became 
more complicated. in fact the organisation found 
itself on the horns of a dilemma: access to local 
communities versus access to international 
resources. indeed, precisely insofar as this was 
the case, the workshop developed a somewhat 
‘existential’ tone. What defined the mission of 
the organisation: was its push to engage local mul-
lahs as religious partners a form of (secular) con-
stitutional betrayal? indeed, how would they sell 
a project delivered by thousands of local mullahs 
to an audience framed by notions of domestic 
accountability in the centre of Washington, D.c.?
Resolving that its primary commitments lay with 
local communities, the second issue concerned 
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the quality of its engagement with local mullahs. 
Did its own human rights orientation converge 
with the religious orientation of its local partners? 
and, if not, should the organisation attempt to 
access the mullahs’ grassroots networks while, at 
the same time, securing greater control over the 
details of their programmatic message? eventu-
ally, the organisation managed to convince itself 
that its core values did not conflict with those of 
its religious partners—that, notwithstanding cer-
tain forms of gendered differentiation, there was 
nothing in the qur’anic language preferred by its 
partners that cut against the organisation’s core 
understanding of basic human rights. 
still, the leaders of the organisation lamented their 
loss of control over the mode of articulating those 
rights. While it appreciated the ways in which 
local mullahs set about using religious references 
to challenge discriminatory local customs, it 
lamented the fact that its partners did not discuss 
(a) ‘freedom of conscience’ as a principle or (b) the 
‘principle’ of religious non-establishment. instead, 
local mullahs began from a position of ‘establish-
ment’, accusing custom-bound ‘sinners’ of stray-
ing from the path of islam in order to enhance 
women’s rights.
For the americans, the price of local ‘access’ was 
not defined in terms of specific programmatic 
objectives; that price unfolded at the level of local 
language and direct discursive control. briefly 
stated, the americans found that, in their bid to 
make local mullahs the foundation of their pro-
gramme—indeed, in their bid to ‘translate’ a par-
ticular set of rights provisions into a more persua-
sive local idiom—they were involved in funding 
the women’s-rights equivalent of Malaysia’s Faith 
Rehabilitation centres: ‘translating’ a particular 
understanding of rights via islamic institutions 
and Muslim partners. 
in the end the american organisation managed 
to convince itself that its programmatic objec-
tives were being met, even as the mullahs came 
to believe that collaborating with a secular human 
rights organisation did not amount to an existen-
tial constitutional threat.
Conclusion
Malaysia’s Faith Rehabilitation centres are vili-
fied, both by human rights advocates (who see 
them as an obnoxious constraint on private reli-
gious belief) and by con-servative Muslim clerics 
(who see them as encouraging, or at least allowing, 
apostasy). The american programme described 
above has also faced pointed criticism, both on 
the part of secular donors (who object to the role 
of mullahs in delivering a women’s rights agenda) 
and on the part of Muslim clerics (who worry that 
a ‘foreign’ organization is using local mullahs to 
dismantle gendered Muslim norms). 
Moving away from its non-establishment prin-
ciples in the direction of its partners’ establish-
ment principles, however, the american organisa-
tion discovered that, even in the case of women’s 
rights, it may be possible to have its human rights 
‘content’ without direct control over the language 
adopted by local mullahs. and, of course, lawmak-
ers in negeri sembilan found that it may be pos-
sible to ‘islamise’ the process of apostasy in ways 
that ‘permit’ individual freedom of conscience. 
in both cases, the most important risk—namely, 
the risk of existential political subversion—was 
avoided. 
apostasy is interesting because, although it 
appears to unfold at the level of individual belief, 
it is, in fact, closely related to the possibility of 
mass conversion and, thus, the possibility of polit-
ical subversion. apostasy is interesting because, 
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politically, individual consciences always stand 
in for domestic (and international) pressures that 
threaten an existing constitutional order. The 
existing constitutional order may involve specific 
forms of ‘establishment’. it may involve princi-
ples of ‘non-establishment’. The question is never 
whether subversion will be regulated. The question 
is simply how.
it may be that refusing to work with religious 
groups in established religious states illicits 
greater concerns about u.s. involvement in those 
places—concerns about ‘subversion’ that limit 
america’s ability to press for the advancement of 
human rights. 
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The role of 
the european 
parliament in 
helping to 
protect freedom 
of religion or 
belief via the 
eU’s external 
relations
DR. coRnelis (Dennis) De JonG76
Introduction
before my election as a Member of the european 
Parliament, in 2009, i worked in the netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign affairs as special advisor on 
human Rights and Good Governance. one of 
my main responsibilities was to help in address-
76. Dennis de Jong is Member of the european Parlia-
ment since 2009. he represents the Dutch social-
ist Party. before he entered politics, De Jong worked 
for various ministries in the netherlands, inter alia, 
on human rights issues, as well as in the fields of asy-
lum and immigration, and anti-corruption policies. 
in 2000, he obtained his doctorate at the university 
of Maastricht on the basis of his thesis The Freedom 
of Thought, Conscience and Religion or Belief in the 
United Nations, (intersentia, isbn 90-5095-137-6).
ing issues relating to religion or belief. This con-
cerned not only the protection of freedom of reli-
gion or belief as part of the netherlands’ external 
human rights policies, but also the formulation of 
policies addressing religious tensions in the world, 
either through specific diplomatic initiatives, or 
as part of development co-operation. This meant, 
for example, that i was fully involved in the dip-
lomatic efforts to reduce tensions in the islamic 
world following the issuing of the film Fitna by the 
Dutch MP Geert Wilders. i also set up the knowl-
edge Forum on Religion and belief and Develop-
ment, which was aimed at bringing together the 
expertise of nGos and the ministry concerning 
the actual and potential role of religious and belief 
institutions in development and peace-building.
During my time at the Foreign office, i noticed 
that it is sometimes difficult for diplomats to 
remain objective in matters relating to religion 
or belief. This is the case for those who adhere to 
a specific religious belief and may be tempted to 
focus on violations of the freedom to manifest that 
belief, whilst ignoring violations against members 
of other religions or beliefs. it is also true of those 
who view religion as something of the past and 
have adopted non-theistic or even atheistic beliefs. 
They are entitled to their point of view, but they 
will have to bear in mind that according to the 
un Declaration on the elimination of all Forms 
of intolerance and of Discrimination based on 
Religion or belief77, ‘religion or belief for anyone 
who professes either, is one of the fundamental 
elements in his conception of life and that free-
dom of religion or belief should be fully respected 
and guaranteed’. in both instances it is important 
to realise that, according to the un human Rights 
committee78, freedom of religion or belief protects the 
freedom to manifest theistic, non-theistic and atheis-
tic beliefs. Thus, international human rights standards 
77. Proclaimed by Ga Res. 36/55 of 25 november 1981.
78. Paragraph 2 of General comment no. 22 (ccPR/c/21/
Rev.1/add.4).
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prescribe even-handedness, while leaving no room for 
bias based on any personal views or beliefs.
in the context of classical human rights policies, 
the principle of even-handedness is perhaps still 
generally accepted within the various ministries 
of Foreign affairs. it becomes more complicated 
when the question is raised as to whether religious 
institutions should be seen as important partners 
for the promotion of human rights, good gover-
nance and development more generally. Many 
fear privileged treatment of religious institutions 
or stereotyping groups in societies along religious 
lines. however, religious institutions tend to have 
wide, long-standing networks covering regions 
that are less accessible for embassies, and thus 
they can provide embassies, especially in devel-
oping countries, with important information on 
development issues especially regarding these less 
accessible regions. it is also well known that after a 
peace settlement has been negotiated, the interna-
tional community often leaves the country entirely 
or at least partially. Religious institutions can then 
provide for the necessary follow-up action, in par-
ticular through targeted reconciliation efforts. 
Thus, it is important to keep relations open, not in 
order to privilege religious institutions, but rather 
to take advantage when partnerships can bring 
mutual benefits. That is precisely what we tried to 
establish with the knowledge Forum on Religion 
and belief and Development.
The first steps towards a group 
of like-minded MEPs
i. Role of the European Parliament with respect 
to the EU’s external relations
although with the entry into force of the lisbon 
treaty, the european Parliament obtained many 
new powers, this did not apply to the eu’s exter-
nal policies, which remain largely the prerogative 
of Member states. however, in the same manner 
that co-operation between Member states has 
steadily increased in this area, so too has the dia-
logue between the council, the european exter-
nal action service, and the commission and the 
european Parliament.
The european Parliament has adopted numerous 
resolutions with regard to external human rights 
policies. Moreover, the Parliament must agree 
to the budget lines relating to co-operation with 
third countries, and does not hesitate to make its 
support conditional upon specific requirements 
regarding, inter alia, the human rights dialogue 
with these countries. Finally, the Parliament also 
maintains its own external relations with parlia-
ments in third countries. 
although – also for me personally – there are many 
other competing policy areas requiring attention, 
i have always held the view that the combination 
of the, albeit limited instruments for the Parlia-
ment to exert influence over the eu’s external 
relations, and my own expertise could perhaps 
make it possible to build on the Dutch practices 
and especially make the eeas fully prepared for 
dealing with issues of religion or belief in the con-
text of foreign and development policies.
ii. Building a coalition of like-minded MEPs
Within the european Parliament, there already 
existed several groups dealing with religion or 
belief. a number of MePs were working on initia-
tives focusing in particular on the protection of 
christians world-wide. another group of MePs 
developed itself as a watchdog to promote separa-
tion of church and state at eu level. however, in 
2009 no group of MePs existed yet concentrating 
on the protection of all religions or beliefs.
against this background, i started with the organ-
isation, in 2009, of a special ‘event’ on freedom of 
religion or belief and the eu’s external policies. 
With the help of the spanish Presidency and a 
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number of other representatives from Member 
states’ Foreign offices, we engaged in a lively 
debate on the need for eu guidelines on the pro-
tection of the freedom of religion or belief. such 
guidelines could help in defining when the eu 
should take action in the case of violations of this 
freedom. it was a useful and constructive debate, 
in which not only many nGo-representatives par-
ticipated, but also a number of interested MePs. 
by organising such an event and by carefully not-
ing which MePs are taking part either themselves 
or through their assistants, one gets to know one’s 
potential allies. of course, i continued to organise 
special events, either on specific aspects of free-
dom of religion or belief, or on particular country 
situations. There were always nGos which were 
able to provide me with essential information, 
including on useful speakers during the events. 
eventually, it was possible to find MePs in all 
main groups who want to spend part of their time 
and energy, as well as (human) resources working 
on the protection of freedom of religion or belief. 
With this group, we developed our contacts with 
the eeas and had a couple of meetings with, inter 
alia, the Deputy secretary-General of the eeas, 
Maciej Popowski. These meetings were construc-
tive and provided us with better insights as to how 
the eeas was dealing with the issue.
Part of this process was the elaboration of a work-
ing paper by the group of like-minded MePs to 
be transmitted to the eeas. it contained a num-
ber of recommendations for the working methods 
of the eeas, as well as an annex with the main 
areas or developments of concern. in that respect, 
our paper was, to an extent, comparable to the 
annual reports of the us commission on inter-
national Religious Freedom. however, that is also 
where the comparison comes to a halt: unlike the 
usciRF, our group did not have the capacity for 
thorough analyses, and all we could manage to do 
was to collect existing material and select a num-
ber of concrete themes that struck us as particu-
larly worrisome.
iii. The transition from informal network to 
‘working group’
We discovered that, although the relations with 
the eeas remained very positive, there were limi-
tations to what an informal dialogue can achieve. 
The response from the eeas to our working doc-
ument remained rather general and although we 
sent a follow-up request trying to get more definite 
answers, all we received back was the promise that 
the eeas would participate in a further meeting. 
i can understand this: after all, our document was 
not officially approved by the eP, and therefore the 
eeas could not do more than keep the dialogue 
informal and its responses less formal than might 
otherwise have been the case.
This year, i consulted all members of the group, 
trying to find common ground for a certain degree 
of formalisation of our work. in this respect, it was 
important that, during his visit to the eP, the then-
chair of the usciRF, Mr. leonard leo, told me 
that usciRF was looking to networks like ours. 
For example, in the German bundestag a similar 
network exists and usciRF considers this to be 
one of their counterparts, as an official commis-
sion like in the usa does not exist anywhere in 
europe. it would only be logical to liaise in a com-
parable manner as eP-network with usciRF.
on 17 December 2012, the ‘working group on the 
protection of freedom of religion or belief ’ was 
launched in presence of the eu special Represen-
tative on human Rights, Mr. stavros lambrini-
dis. in this way, the network has become more vis-
ible, both inside and outside the Parliament, and 
already many MePs and nGos have indicated 
their interest in working with the network. in 
order to embed our work in the eP’s general work 
on human rights, it is important that the network 
contributes to the work of the sub-committee on 
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human Rights (DRoi), which is responsible for 
the (external) human rights reports of the eP. after 
a very positive meeting with the chair of DRoi, we 
concluded that it is possible to contribute to the 
eP’s annual reports on human rights. by collect-
ing information throughout the year and submit-
ting this to the Rapporteur, preferably when s/he is 
still in the process of drafting the report, it should 
be possible to include in these reports a specific 
chapter on the protection of freedom of religion 
or belief. This way, the dialogue with the eeas 
will become more formal, as we can refer back to a 
text adopted by the eP as a whole. Finally, we shall 
also try to incorporate specific declarations to be 
added to the budget lines on external relations. 
For example, in the context of an external agree-
ment with a specific country, we can emphasize 
that the human rights dialogue should concen-
trate on certain concerns we may have regarding 
the protection of the freedom of religion or belief.
in January 2013, we shall present a working pro-
gramme for 2013, which will consist of a range of 
events, of submissions to DRoi, as well as of contri-
butions to the discussions on the budget of the eu.
Guidelines
From the very beginning, the network recom-
mended to the eeas to write draft guidelines on 
the protection of freedom of religion or belief. one 
of the main characteristics of this freedom is its 
many possible forms of manifestation. in a way, 
one could argue that freedom of religion or belief 
can be seen as the litmus test for the protection of 
all human rights, since, for example, freedom of 
expression, and freedom of assembly and of asso-
ciation are in a specific way part of the freedom 
of religion or belief, as are many other individual 
human rights. The international human rights 
treaties recognise not only the right to have or to 
change one’s religion or belief, but also the right 
to manifest it both in public and in private. The 
right to build a church, temple or mosque are just 
as much part of the freedom of religion or belief, 
as the right to write and acquire materials relat-
ing to one’s religion or belief, and the right to wear 
religious apparel. unlike the forum internum (the 
right to have or to change one’s religion or belief), 
the external manifestations (the forum externum) 
are not absolute rights. They may be limited, but 
only in accordance with the strictly worded limi-
tation clauses of these treaties.
There are therefore two main challenges for diplo-
mats who want to be active in protecting the free-
dom of religion or belief: the rich variety of mani-
festations, and the fact that certain limitations 
of the freedom to manifest may be legitimate, 
whereas others are clear violations of international 
human rights law. For the european union to take 
action, a certain degree of seriousness must exist. 
This requires (1) evidence that the freedom has 
been limited, (2) that this was not in conformity 
with the requirements laid down in the grounds of 
limitation, and (3) that it does not concern an iso-
lated case, but that there is a pattern of violations, 
for which the government can be held responsible, 
either because it is involved in the violations itself, 
or because it has been negligent in preventing 
them, in protecting the believers and in prosecut-
ing the perpetrators. 
Guidelines are essential in setting priorities. it is 
possible to describe the type of violation and the 
type of pattern that must lead to eu action. it will 
be more difficult to describe in detail which limita-
tions will be permissible. This depends very much 
on the specific circumstances and even amongst 
Member states there are differences: for example, 
some Member states see no harm in prohibit-
ing the wearing of a burqa in public, while other 
Member states are of the opinion that such a gen-
eral prohibition would constitute a violation of the 
right to wear religious apparel. it is clear that eu 
actions should not concern cases in which one can 
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have differing opinions on their permissibility. 
The guidelines should concentrate on serious and 
persisting violations of the freedom of religion or 
belief. For example, the systematic discrimination 
against certain religious minorities calls for eu 
action, as does the deliberate destruction of reli-
gious buildings and sites. 
although originally, the draft guidelines were to 
be published for consultation in 2012, this has not 
yet happened. a previous version had been infor-
mally shared by the eeas with the Parliament’s 
secretariat and members of the working group 
had already been asked to prepare their com-
ments by the bureau of DRoi. however, it soon 
transpired that this version had been considered 
overly-long and that the eeas was already work-
ing on a shorter version. although the working 
group was impressed with the efforts undertaken, 
it also noted that the guidelines failed to indicate 
‘red lines’ for embassies and delegations, i.e. the 
type of violations which require immediate diplo-
matic action. in an even shorter version this may 
become yet more difficult, but without such clear 
markers, the guidelines risk having no practical 
effect. as soon as the draft guidelines are avail-
able, the working group will draw up comments, 
specifically focusing on this question.
Focal point
apart from the call for guidelines, the network 
has also asked eeas to make at least one of their 
officials responsible for matters relating to religion 
or belief. such a focal point could help in co-ordi-
nating the various activities, not only in respect of 
human rights policies, but also as far as the role of 
religious institutions in third countries are con-
cerned. as pointed out above, the role of such insti-
tutions in reconciliation efforts, in the promotion 
of good governance (anti-corruption) and in devel-
opment as a whole cannot be overestimated.
although originally we were seriously concerned 
with the fact that it took a long time before a cru-
cial vacancy within the eeas was filled and desk 
work could be stepped up within that service, more 
recent developments are promising. The vacancy 
has been filled, the eeas has become much more 
active and the special Representative for human 
Rights of the eeas takes a personal interest in the 
matter. Thus, the working group is confident that 
under his guidance, the idea of a focal point may 
be further explored.
We also hope that the inclusion of a special chapter 
on freedom of religion or belief in the eP’s annual 
report on human rights will lead to a permanent 
dialogue with the eeas on our main concerns. 
now that the structure is in place, we must move 
on to the work on the ground. by collecting infor-
mation in an ever more professional manner, we 
should, like the usciRF, be in a position to have 
a meaningful dialogue on country situations and 
on developments of concern.
Conclusion
it always takes a long time to master the proce-
dures in brussels. however, by building a non-
partisan coalition, individual MePs can exert suf-
ficient influence to make things move. Within the 
eP, the various tendencies described above will 
continue to exist. some MePs will remain espe-
cially concerned with the plight of christians, and 
considering the ever more difficult situation for 
these groups in parts of the world, it is legitimate 
to include their concerns in our work. however, 
we shall have to remain even-handed, as has also 
been expressed by DRoi as one of its main con-
cerns. Persecution of religious minorities needs to 
be dealt with, irrespective of the religion or belief 
concerned. on this basis, the network is convinced 
that it will be possible to continue to find common 
ground and to make progress in furthering the pro-
tection of freedom of religion or belief world-wide.
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The european 
external action 
service and 
Freedom of 
religion or Belief
Jean beRnaRD bolVin79
Introduction
it is not that often that scholars, diplomats, mem-
bers of parliament, religious leaders and practitio-
ners are able to share views on Freedom of Reli-
gion or belief (FoRb). i welcome this opportunity 
which is a perfect occasion to have a look at FoRb 
from different angles. The eeas has developed 
activities in the field of FoRb, in line with the 
overall eu engagement on this issue. as regards 
to some of the views expressed earlier during this 
workshop, even though not directly linked to the 
eu’s action, i would like to make the point that 
the eu is not promoting any “hidden agenda” in 
defending and promoting FoRb worldwide. and i 
am really confident that the eu, while enhancing 
work on this fundamental right, is far from being 
engaged in any “self-satisfactory exercise”.
79. Desk officier, human Rights Policy instruments unit, 
european external action service. This presentation 
was made in a personal capacity of the author and 
does not reflect the position of the european union, 
the european commission or the european external 
action service
The rise of religious 
intolerance and the EU action
over the last few years, as the world witnessed a 
surge of acts of religious intolerance and discrimi-
nation, as epitomised by violence and terrorist 
attacks in various countries, such as egypt, iraq, 
nigeria, or many other countries, the eu has been 
increasingly dedicated to the promotion and pro-
tection of FoRb. This freedom protects the right to 
have theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as 
well as the right not to profess any religion. it also 
covers the right to adopt, change or abandon one’s 
religion or belief of one’s own free will. The eu 
takes the view that freedom of religion or belief is 
a fundamental right to which everyone is entitled, 
outside and within the eu, and that the defence of 
such universal principles is essential to the devel-
opment of free societies. it has to be made clear 
though that the eu does not associate itself with 
any specific religion or belief: all must be treated 
in an indiscriminate manner, everywhere. 
Discrimination based on religion or belief is a 
long-lasting concern in all regions of the world, 
and persons belonging to particular religious 
communities continue to be targeted in many 
countries. Moreover, legislation on defamation of 
religions has often been used to mistreat religious 
minorities and to limit freedom of opinion and 
expression as well as freedom of religion or belief 
itself, two fundamental freedoms which are intrin-
sically linked. Freedom of expression also plays an 
important role in the fight against intolerance. 
in line with previous council conclusions of 16 
november 200980, the Foreign affairs council 
adopted conclusions on 21 February 201181 reaf-
80. see 2973rd General affairs council meeting Council 
conclusions on freedom of religion or belief, , brussels, 
16 november 2009, available at: http://www.consil-
ium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsupload/111190.pdf 
81. see 3069th Foreign affairs council meeting, Council 
conclusions on intolerance, discrimination and violence 
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firming the eu’s strong commitment on FoRb, 
and recalled that it needed to be protected every-
where and for everyone. They stressed the fact 
that it is the primary duty of states to protect their 
citizens, including persons belonging to religious 
minorities, as well as all people living in their 
jurisdiction, and safeguard their rights. all per-
sons belonging to religious minorities should be 
able to practice their religion and worship freely, 
individually or in community with others, with-
out fear of intolerance and attacks.
subsequently, the eu reminded all eu Delega-
tions that they had, alongside with Member states 
diplomatic missions, a crucial role to play in mak-
ing tangible positive impact as regard respect for 
FoRb in third countries where this fundamental 
human right is violated or challenged.
eu Delegations were therefore formally asked to 
conduct actions to raise awareness among eu dip-
lomats on the issue, to engage with the authorities 
of partner countries on a systematic manner on 
FoRb, especially those where it is seen as a major 
issue, and to develop contacts with local human 
rights defenders working on such rights. Delega-
tions have since then been engaged in close moni-
toring of restrictions to FoRb in their respective 
host countries. Their assessments of the local situ-
ations, provided on more than 100 countries, are 
being currently updated under the human Rights 
country strategies framework.
over the last years, the eu also made an increased 
use of existing tools at bilateral and multilateral 
levels to more effectively promote and protect 
freedom of religion or belief. The ad hoc coun-
cil Working Group on human Rights task Force 
on FoRb carried on supporting the implementa-
tion of the eu’s enhanced actions and helped to 
develop guidance for the use of the eu diplomats. 
on the basis of religion or belief, brussels, 21 February 
2011, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/genaff/119404.
pdf 
The topic has been included in the human rights 
training provided to the eu staff. 
in relations with non-eu countries, freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion has been system-
atically raised with a high number of interlocutors 
at different levels of political dialogue, including 
in human rights dialogues and consultations.
The eu has engaged bilaterally with various 
countries on the crucial importance of this uni-
versal human right, and explored possibilities of 
further cooperation, including at the multilateral 
fora. under these dialogues the eu has voiced 
its concerns regarding the implementation of 
this right and the situation of religious minori-
ties. Whenever prompted by serious violations 
and concerns regarding religious freedom and 
related intolerance and discrimination, the eu 
has expressed its views via diplomatic channels, 
public statements and council conclusions. it has 
continued to advocate full respect for the freedom 
of thought and conscience, in line with interna-
tional standards. Furthermore, the current pro-
cess of establishing country human rights strate-
gies will allow to focus eu action and attention in 
countries where FoRb is a priority.
eu action has also concerned the multilateral 
level, notably in the human Rights council in 
Geneva and at the united nations General assem-
bly in new york. Priority was given to the consoli-
dation of the consensus on the need to fight reli-
gious intolerance, whilst avoiding the concept of 
defamation of religion to be claimed as a human 
rights standard. such a notion, which aims at pro-
tecting religion in itself rather than persons dis-
criminated because of their religion or belief is 
detrimental to other core human rights, such as 
freedom of expression. 
at the 16th session of the human Rights council, 
in march 2011, an important breakthrough was 
achieved with the adoption by consensus of reso-
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lution 16/18: for the first time, the organization 
of islamic cooperation (oic) did not include the 
concept of defamation of religion in its resolution, 
now entitled “Combating intolerance, negative ste-
reotyping and stigmatisation of, and discrimina-
tion, incitement to violence and violence against 
persons based on religion or belief ”82. efforts by 
Pakistan and the united states of america, with 
active eu support, were instrumental in achieving 
this result. The traditional eu resolution on free-
dom of religion or belief was also adopted without 
a vote (resolution 16/13)83.
high Representative and Vice-President of the 
commission catherine ashton and several For-
eign affairs ministers from eu Member states 
joined the istanbul meeting (launching the so 
called “istanbul process”) convened in June 2011 
by the oic and the usa on the fight against reli-
gious intolerance, whose objective was to consoli-
date the gains obtained in Geneva in view of the 
forthcoming 66th session of the united nations 
General assembly. The oic/usa co-chairs com-
muniqué called for implementation of resolution 
16/18 whilst referring also to the other resolutions 
on FoRb adopted by consensus. 
at the unGa 66th session, the eu aimed at con-
solidating achievements of previous years regard-
ing its own resolution on the elimination of all 
forms of intolerance and of discrimination based 
on religion or belief and, at the same time, ensur-
ing confirmation of the consensual approach 
taken by the oic in Geneva. such objectives were 
82. un human Rights council,  Combating intolerance, 
negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and dis-
crimination, incitement to violence, and violence 
against persons based on religion or belief : resolu-
tion / adopted by the Human Rights Council, 12 april 
2011,  a/hRc/Res/16/18,  available at: http://www.
unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4db960f92.html
83. un human Rights council,  Freedom of religion or 
belief : resolution / adopted by the Human Rights Coun-
cil, 12 april 2011,  a/hRc/Res/16/13,  available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4db95c7c2.html
met with the adoption without vote on 19 Decem-
ber 2011, of eu sponsored resolution 66/168, and 
of oic sponsored resolution 66/197 on combating 
intolerance, negative stereotyping, stigmatization, 
discrimination, incitement to violence and vio-
lence against persons, based on religion or belief84. 
last but not least, the Foreign affairs council 
adopted on 25 June 2012 the eu strategic Frame-
work on human Rights85, along with its action 
Plan: the elaboration of eu guidelines on freedom 
of religion or belief is one of its early deliverables. 
such guidelines, which should be adopted in the 
course of 2013, are not legally binding, but they 
represent a strong political signal that these issues 
are priorities for the union. They will consist in 
messages, practical instructions and guidance to 
eu and Member states staff in diplomatic post-
ings and in headquarters on how to assess situ-
ations and to engage in the most pragmatic way.
eeas action from an “american 
perspective”
i would like to address a few points made by 
knox Thames in his working paper published by 
ReligioWest86. The observations he made “from 
an american perspective” on the eu approach, 
notably regarding advancing FoRb through the 
new set of eu guidelines, are highly valuable. on 
the “czar” on religious freedom within the eeas 
that he is calling for, i would like to point out 
that, with the recent nomination of stavros lam-
84. This approach was upheld in March 2012 in the 19th 
session of the human Rights council and in Decem-
ber 2012 in the 67th session of the unGa.
85. The full text of the eu strategic Framework on 
human Rights is available here: http://www.consil-
ium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
foraff/131181.pdf 
86. see knox Thames, Making Freedom of Religion or 
Belief a True EU Priority, eui Working Papers, 
Rscas 2012/41, July 2012, available at: http://www.
eui.eu/Projects/ReligioWest/Documents/workingpa-
per/Rscas2012-41.pdf 
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brinidis as eu special Representative on human 
Rights (eusR), such an expectation might have 
been fulfilled, even though the eusR’s mandate 
covers a wide range of issues, including FoRb. on 
the “clear strategy” regarding the guidelines and 
their content, work is underway within the eeas 
to make sure that the guidelines are as inclusive as 
possible. They will of course address both aspects 
of FoRb (forum internum and forum externum). 
on the funding, i have to say that it is the eu’s 
intention to enhance support to projects promot-
ing tolerance and dialogue through training and 
awareness raising on FoRb, notably through the 
european instrument for Democracy and human 
Rights (eiDhR). The eiDhR already funds proj-
ects related to FoRb worldwide. a specific call 
for proposals will be launched in spring 2013, on 
projects related to the promotion and defence of 
this fundamental freedom. The new draft eiDhR 
Regulation for 2014-2020 includes specifically the 
issue of Freedom of religion or belief as a priority 
issue to be referred to in the answers to calls for 
proposals. 
conclusion
The work conducted by the eeas over the last 
month on the elaboration of FoRb guidelines is 
definitely in line with the eu’s dedication to the 
defense and promotion of FoRb over the last years. 
it is a clear sign of the crucial importance that 
the eu attaches to upholding such a fundamen-
tal freedom. in doing so, the eu is not promot-
ing “occidental” values, but emphasizes the uni-
versality of such a right, which should be equally 
enjoyed in all parts of the world. 
nb: The eu guidelines on the promotion and 
protection of freedom for religion or belief have 
been adopted by the eu Foreign affairs coun-
cil on 24 June 2013, after a consultation process 
which involved relevant civil society organisa-
tions, including religious, philosophical and non 
confessional ones. The guidelines have also been 
discussed with the european Parliament and with 
international organisations (osce/coe/un).
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The United 
states’ approach 
to promoting 
international 
religious 
Freedom: the 1998 
international 
religious Freedom 
act
elizabeth k. cassiDy87
Introduction
in october 1998, the u.s. congress passed and 
President bill clinton signed into law the inter-
national Religious Freedom act, or iRFa, which 
seeks to make religious freedom a higher prior-
ity in u.s. human rights policy. as more fully 
described below, the law established an offi-
cial and office in the u.s. state Department to 
focus on religious freedom abroad; mandated 
the state Department to report annually on the 
issue; required the executive branch to designate 
egregious religious freedom violators and seek 
improvements in those countries; and created an 
87. Deputy Director of Policy and Research, u.s. com-
mission on international Religious Freedom. The 
views expressed here are my own and may or may not 
reflect the views of the commission. 
independent, bipartisan advisory commission on 
the issue, the u.s. commission on international 
Religious Freedom (usciRF). 
congress ultimately adopted iRFa nearly unani-
mously, but there were serious divisions during 
its drafting and consideration, and the law that 
emerged was not what originally was proposed. 
one major issue involved how much discretion 
the law should afford the executive branch. one 
side of this dispute feared too much legislative 
interference in the executive branch’s foreign pol-
icy power, while the other believed the executive 
branch, particularly the state Department, would 
not address religious freedom without outside 
pressure. usciRF’s creation was an effort to rec-
oncile these two views: the commission was cre-
ated to be a watchdog over the executive branch’s 
implementation of iRFa (which provided more 
discretion than the second camp wanted), as well 
as a think tank to develop new, but non-binding, 
policy ideas.
some critics of iRFa incorrectly claim that it 
favors christians and seeks to promote chris-
tianity. This misperception is based on the role 
of christian activists in seeking legislation and 
the fact that the initial, house bill – commonly 
referred to as “Wolf-specter,” and which would 
have been called “the Freedom from Religious 
Persecution act” – focused on the persecution of 
certain specified groups, particularly christians, 
tibetan buddhists, and baha’is, by islamic and 
communist governments. however, the bill that 
congress passed, President clinton signed, and 
the u.s. government has been implementing for 
the past 14 years was not Wolf-specter, but rather a 
senate bill – “nickels-lieberman,” or “the interna-
tional Religious Freedom act” – which focuses on 
the internationally-guaranteed right to freedom of 
religion or belief for everyone, everywhere.88
88. For a detailed description of the legislative history of 
iRFa, see t. Jeremy Gunn, “The united states and 
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I. IRFA’s Principal Provisions
Within the executive branch, iRFa created the 
position of ambassador at large for international 
Religious Freedom (a political appointee nomi-
nated by the President and confirmed by the sen-
ate), to head an international religious freedom 
office at the state Department. it mandated the 
state Department to prepare an annual report on 
religious freedom conditions in each foreign coun-
try, in addition to the department’s annual human 
rights report. and it required the President – who 
has delegated this power to the secretary of state 
– to designate as “countries of particular concern,” 
or cPcs, those countries whose governments 
either engage in or tolerate “systematic, ongo-
ing, egregious” violations of religious freedom, 
and to take action to encourage improvements in 
those countries. a variety of actions is available 
from which to choose, from negotiating a bilat-
eral agreement to imposing sanctions to issuing 
a waiver. it also mandated training on religious 
freedom for state Department foreign service offi-
cers and u.s. immigration officials, and included 
religious freedom as an element of u.s. foreign 
assistance, cultural exchange, and international 
broadcasting programs. 
outside the executive branch, iRFa created 
usciRF, an independent advisory body man-
dated to review religious freedom conditions glob-
ally and make recommendations for u.s. policy to 
the President, secretary of state, and congress, 
including recommending countries for cPc des-
ignation. although a government entity, usciRF 
has no policy-making power. all usciRF policy 
recommendations, including cPc recommenda-
tions, are non-binding, though over the years the 
executive branch and congress have chosen to 
adopt some of them.
the Promotion of Freedom of Religion or belief”, see 
supra at 59.
usciRF is led by nine part-time commissioners 
appointed by the President and the leadership of 
both political parties in both houses of congress. 
Three commissioners are appointed by the White 
house (with no requirement of senate confirma-
tion), three by house leaders, and three by senate 
leaders, under a formula such that five commis-
sioners are appointed by the President’s party and 
four by the other party. The state Department’s 
ambassador at large for international Religious 
Freedom also serves ex-officio as a non-voting 
commissioner. usciRF has a full-time, non-
partisan professional staff of 14, of whom 7 are 
responsible for research and policy analysis.
usciRF commissioners are private citizens who 
serve as volunteers. They are appointed for two 
years and can be reappointed – subject to, as of 
2012, a two-term limit. according to iRFa, com-
missioners are to be “selected among distinguished 
individuals noted for their knowledge and experi-
ence in fields relevant to the issue of international 
religious freedom, including foreign affairs, direct 
experience abroad, human rights, and interna-
tional law.” over usciRF’s life, commissioners 
have come from a wide range of professional and 
religious backgrounds.
to carry out its work, usciRF commissioners 
and staff travel, hold hearings and events, meet 
with a variety of interlocutors, conduct research, 
testify before congress, speak to the public and 
the press, and issue written reports and other doc-
uments. We gather information from a wide range 
of sources including u.s. and foreign officials, 
international and regional organizations, human 
rights organizations, religious organizations, and 
academic and policy experts.
usciRF presents its findings and recommenda-
tions in an annual report, which is issued by May 
1 of each year, and in other publications through-
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out the year, all of which are available at www.
uscirf.gov. usciRF’s annual reports focus on the 
countries it recommends for cPc designation or 
believes are close to the statutory cPc threshold, 
as well as the u.s. executive branch’s implementa-
tion of iRFa, u.s. asylum policy, and religious free-
dom issues at the united nations and organization 
of security and cooperation in europe (osce).
to ensure bipartisanship, iRFa requires a quo-
rum of six voting commissioners to conduct 
usciRF business. This includes determining 
countries and issues to address, approving travel, 
and approving recommendations, reports, and 
other publications. commissioners generally 
have sought to reach their decisions by consensus, 
knowing that usciRF’s recommendations will be 
more persuasive with bipartisan support. in the 
event of disagreements, iRFa expressly allows any 
commissioner(s) to issue individual or dissenting 
statements, which are designated as such. 
II. Religious Freedom Violations 
under IRFA
iRFa defines violations of religious freedom as 
“violations of the internationally recognized right 
to freedom of religion and religious belief and 
practice” as articulated in the universal Decla-
ration of human Rights, the international cov-
enant on civil and Political Rights (iccPR), the 
helsinki accords, and other international instru-
ments. under these instruments, respecting reli-
gious freedom is not only a matter of protecting 
the freedom of religious communities, as groups, 
to engage in worship and other collective activi-
ties. it also encompasses the freedom of every 
individual to hold, or not to hold, any religion or 
belief, as well as the freedom to manifest such a 
religion or belief through worship, practice, teach-
ing, and observance, broadly construed, subject 
to only specified, narrow limitations. Religious 
freedom also is closely related to the freedoms of 
expression, association, and assembly, as well as 
protections of equality and against discrimination. 
The meaning of “religion or belief” is broad, and 
includes theistic, non-theistic, atheistic, agnostic, 
syncretic, “traditional,” “new,” favored, and disfa-
vored beliefs alike, as well as no religion or belief at 
all. usciRF’s reporting reflects this broad scope. 
For example, we have documented violations 
against and advocated for the religious freedom 
rights of Muslims, christians, buddhists, hindus, 
sikhs, baha’is, Jews, Mandaeans, yazidis, Falun 
Gong, hoa hao, cao Dai, scientologists, adher-
ents of folk religions, atheists, and secular indi-
viduals, among others, in the various countries on 
which we report.
as previously mentioned, iRFa requires usciRF 
to recommend and the u.s. executive branch to 
designate “countries of particular concern,” or 
cPcs. cPcs are those countries whose govern-
ments either engage in or tolerate “systematic, 
ongoing, egregious” violations of religious free-
dom, which iRFa further defines as including 
“(a) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment; (b) prolonged detention 
without charges; (c) causing the disappearance of 
persons by the abduction or clandestine detention 
of those persons; or (D) other flagrant denial of 
the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons.” 
in determining whether to recommend cPc des-
ignation for a particular country, we first collect 
information as to the religious freedom violations 
that are occurring in that country, and then assess 
whether those violations meet the “systematic, 
ongoing, egregious” standard. This is an exercise 
of legal, not scientific, analysis, and different indi-
viduals sometimes come to different conclusions.
There currently are eight cPcs designated by the 
secretary of state on behalf of the President; the 
most recent designations were made in september 
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2011. usciRF agrees with these designations, and 
in its 2012 annual report recommended that eight 
other countries also should be cPcs. table 1 at 
the end of this paper show the state Department’s 
cPc designations, usciRF’s cPc recommen-
dations, and the countries on usciRF’s “Watch 
list,” where the violations engaged in or tolerated 
by the government approach, but do not meet, the 
cPc standard. table 2 shows the actions that the 
state Department has taken pursuant to iRFa in 
the countries that it has designated as cPcs. 
Thus far, the impact of the cPc mechanism has 
been mixed, with the most progress occurring 
the first time a country receives a designation or 
recommendation. The state Department’s initial 
cPc designations of saudi arabia and Vietnam 
and usciRF’s initial cPc recommendations for 
turkmenistan and nigeria did produce some posi-
tive changes in those countries. yet saudi arabia 
remains a state Department cPc, and all four 
remain among usciRF’s cPc recommendations. 
The eight countries currently on the state Depart-
ment’s cPc list have been so designated for years.89 
The u.s. Government accountability office, 
another congressionally-created watchdog agency, 
currently is conducting a study into the iRFa 
mechanisms’ effectiveness. it will be interesting to 
see their conclusions regarding iRFa’s impact.
of course, countries on the state Department’s 
and usciRF’s lists are not the only countries in the 
world where religious freedom violations occur, 
89. burma, china, iran, and sudan have been state Depart-
ment cPcs since 1999; north korea since 2002; eritrea 
and saudi arabia since 2004; and uzbekistan since 
2006. since iRFa’s inception, two countries have been 
placed on the state Department’s cPc list and later 
removed: iraq (1999-2002) and Vietnam (2004-2005). 
in addition, the taliban regime of afghanistan and the 
Milosevic regime of the serbian Republic of yugosla-
via were designated by the state Department as “par-
ticularly severe violators” for several years but removed 
after those regimes fell (1999-2002 for the taliban 
regime, and 1999-2000 for the Milosevic regime).
and a country’s absence from usciRF’s annual 
reports does not mean that it has no religious free-
dom problems. With usciRF’s current size and 
structure, we have been able to address some 25 to 
30 countries in each of the past few years’ annual 
reports (a large increase from usciRF’s first sev-
eral annual reports, which covered fewer than 10). 
The state Department’s annual international reli-
gious freedom report does include all countries.90
III. Examples of USCIRF’s Work
The following are some examples of usciRF’s 
work on a range of countries and issues: 
•	 usciRF worked for a number of years with the 
state Department, members of congress, and 
nGos to increase opposition to the flawed “def-
amation of religions” resolutions at the un.91 in 
March 2011, the “defamation” resolutions were 
replaced with unhRc Resolution 16/18, a posi-
tive approach that focuses on fighting religious 
intolerance, discrimination, and violence with-
out restricting speech.
•	 usciRF also has worked to raise aware-
ness among non-governmental organizations 
(nGos) about un mechanisms that provide 
venues for civil society advocacy on religious 
freedom issues, such as the universal Periodic 
Review process and the mandate of the special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or belief, 
including by holding roundtables with and 
briefings for interested nGos.
•	 For years, usciRF called attention, including at 
high levels of the u.s. and saudi governments, 
to the plight of hadi al-Mutif, an ismaili Muslim 
jailed for apostasy in 1994. he was finally par-
doned by king abdullah and released in early 
2012. over the years, usciRF also has helped 
90. see http://www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt/index.htm.
91. see http://www.uscirf.gov/issues/defamation-of-reli-
gions.html
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secure the release of other religious prisoners, 
including in turkmenistan, Pakistan, afghani-
stan, and Vietnam, sometimes through public 
advocacy and sometimes through behind-the-
scenes work.
•	 based on a usciRF recommendation, congress 
included language imposing targeted sanctions 
on human rights and religious freedom viola-
tors in the 2010 iran sanctions act. This was 
the first time iran sanctions ever specifically 
included human rights violators. President 
obama has now imposed such sanctions (visa 
bans and asset freezes) by executive order on 13 
iranian officials, including 8 identified as egre-
gious religious freedom violators by usciRF.
•	 also based on a usciRF recommendation, 
the senate included chechen President Ram-
zan kadyrov on the list of gross human rights 
violators in the sergei Magnitsky Rule of law 
accountability act, which imposes u.s. visa 
bans and asset freezes on designated Russian 
officials. kadyrov has engaged in abuses against 
Muslims and has been linked to politically-
motivated killings.
•	 usciRF successfully urged the state Depart-
ment to revoke a tourist visa it had granted to 
narendra Modi, chief Minister of the indian 
state of Gujarat, in 2005. a provision that iRFa 
added to the u.s. immigration and nationality 
act makes inadmissible to the united states for-
eign government officials who were responsible 
for or carried out particularly severe violations 
of religious freedom. Modi has been implicated 
for failing to act to stop hindu mob violence 
in his province in 2002 that killed thousands, 
mostly Muslims.
•	 usciRF has highlighted the problem of reli-
gious intolerance in several countries’ educa-
tion systems. after a usciRF report docu-
menting hateful language in saudi government 
textbooks,92 some of the passages that promoted 
intolerance and incited violence were removed. 
More recently, usciRF issued a study examin-
ing how Pakistan’s secular and religious edu-
cation systems teach about religious minori-
ties.93 The study examined textbooks in all four 
provinces and leading madrassas, as well as 
conducted teacher and student interviews, and 
found that intolerance is taught in Pakistani 
schools. it has become a frequently-cited refer-
ence documenting this problem.
•	 usciRF produced a study compiling and ana-
lyzing the constitutional provisions regarding 
religious freedom and the religion-state rela-
tionship in countries that are members of the 
organization of islamic cooperation – first 
issued in 2005 and updated this year – as part 
of efforts to advocate for strong religious free-
dom protections in the new constitutions of 
afghanistan, iraq, and now the arab awaken-
ing countries.94
•	 usciRF conducted a major research study 
into the u.s. government’s treatment of asylum 
seekers that found serious flaws placing asy-
lum seekers at risk of being returned to coun-
tries where they could face persecution, as well 
as concerns about detention conditions.95 The 
92. see press release available at: http://www.uscirf.gov/
news-room/press-releases/2206.html.
93. see usciRF, Connecting the dots: Education and Reli-
gious Discrimination in Pakistan. A Study of  Public 
Schools and Madrassas, 2011, availiable at: http://www.
uscirf.gov/reports-and-briefs/special-reports/3660.html
94. see http://www.uscirf.gov/issues/muslim-constitutions.html
95. see http://www.uscirf.gov/issues/asylum-a-refugees.
html under a process called “expedited Removal,” 
u.s. immigration officials are empowered to summar-
ily return people arriving in the united states without 
proper documentation to their country of origin. as 
part of this process, asylum seekers (who often do not 
have proper documents) are detained while a deter-
mination is made if they have a “credible fear” of per-
secution. if credible fear is found, the case is sent to 
an immigration judge, and the asylum seeker may be 
Freedom of Religion or Belief in Foreign Policy. Which one?57
study, which was issued in 2005, made a series 
of recommendations to the responsible agencies 
in the Departments of homeland security and 
Justice. The Department of Justice promptly 
implemented the recommendations, but the 
Department of homeland security (Dhs) did 
not. usciRF continues to engage with Dhs 
agencies regarding recommended reforms. in 
early 2009, Dhs announced detention reforms 
that would address some of usciRF’s concerns, 
and we are now working on a report assessing 
the implementation of those reforms. 
•	 usciRF also has funded innovative research 
through a fellowship program.96
paroled while the case is pending. however, if cred-
ible fear of persecution is not found, the asylum seeker 
is put back in the expedited Removal process and 
removed promptly.
96. see http://www.uscirf.gov/about-uscirf/fellowships.html
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Table 2: Actions Taken Under IRFA
The following Presidential actions under section 402(c)(1) of IRFA were approved by Secretary Clinton on August 18, 2011
Burma The existing, ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 cFR 126.1(a).
China The existing, ongoing restrictions on exports to china of crime control and detection instru-
ments and equipment, under P.l. 101-246 and the Foreign Relations authorization act of 
1990 and 1991.
Eritrea The existing, ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 cFR 126.1(a). 
Iran The existing, ongoing restrictions on certain imports from and exports to iran, in accordance 
with section 103(b) of the comprehensive iran sanctions, accountability, and Divestment 
act of 2010 (P.l. 111-195).
North Korea The existing, ongoing restrictions to which north korea is subject, pursuant to sections 402 
and 209 of the trade act of 1974 (the Jackson-Vanik amendment).
Sudan The restriction on making certain appropriated funds available for assistance to the Govern-
ment of sudan in the annual Department of state, Foreign operations, and Related Programs 
appropriations act, currently set forth in section 7070(f) of the Department of state, Foreign 
operations, and Related Programs appropriations act, 2010 (Div. F, P.l. 111-117), as carried 
forward by the Full-year continuing appropriations act, 2011 (Div. b, P.l. 112-10) and any 
provision of law that is the same or substantially the same as this provision.
Saudi Arabia 
& Uzbekistan
Waived the requirements of section 405(a) of the iRF act with respect to saudi arabia, and 
uzbekistan, to further the purposes of the iRFa.
Table 1: 2012 CPC and Watch List Countries
Countries Designated as CPCs by 
the Department of State
USCIRF Recommendations for 
CPC Designation
U S C I R F 
Watch List Countries
burma
china
eritrea
iran
north korea
saudi arabia
sudan
uzbekistan
burma
china
eritrea
iran
north korea
saudi arabia
sudan
uzbekistan
egypt
iraq
nigeria
Pakistan
tajikistan
turkey
turkmenistan
Vietnam
afghanistan
belarus
cuba
india
indonesia
laos
Russia
somalia
Venezuela
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reporting 
on religious 
freedom: the 
“governmental” 
approach and 
the issue of 
legitimacy 
Pasquale FeRRaRa97
Introduction
in the general context of a growing attention 
devoted to religion in world politics, religious 
freedom is becoming increasingly relevant. Gov-
ernments are being made more and more account-
able vis-à-vis the respect of religious minorities, 
and international organisations are more reactive 
than in the recent past to the obstacles and restric-
tions that limit the enjoyment of this fundamen-
tal freedom. if religious freedom clearly consti-
tutes a new defining field for the advancement of 
human rights in relation to state behaviour, it is 
also becoming, with increasing saliency, an issue 
that challenges the traditional diplomatic manner 
of implementing inter-state diplomacy.
97. secretary General european university institute
in particular, a plethora of “reports” on religious 
freedom are released regularly by governments, 
international institutions, special rapporteurs and 
religious bodies. in several cases, such reporting 
activity is realised via documents specifically and 
exclusively addressing religious freedom; more 
often, religious freedom is included in the moni-
toring of human rights regulations and practices 
at the international level. in this latter case, reli-
gious freedom is not the only and exclusive sub-
ject of the monitoring activity and it represents a 
sub-set of a broader reporting activity regarding 
human rights in general. 
I. Standards, actors, 
legitimacy, policy 
in general, there are four major issues related to 
reporting on religious freedom: the definition of 
standards, the nature of the actors involved (both as 
observers and observed), legitimacy, and the policy 
consequences (changes in bilateral and multilateral 
relations, “reciprocity”, sanctions, travel advice).
The definition of standards is not an easy task. 
some standards can be set against the general 
“codex” of human rights; other standards have 
a more limited focus, and relate to the respect 
of freedom of religion from the point of view of 
one specific faith. in the reporting activity on 
freedom of religion, the most common standard 
should be the principle of equality (the same set of 
basic rights granted to any religious organisation 
operating in a given State); in practice, what often 
seems to be implemented, especially in report-
ing activities performed by national governments 
or religious non-governmental organisations is 
what we could call the “principle of proportional-
ity”, meaning the evaluation of the distinct place 
and impact of the different religions and religious 
institutions in a given society. 
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lar concern”). From its side, the organisation of 
the islamic conference (an inter-governmental 
organisation98), though its “observatory” com-
piles yearly a report on islamophobia99 covering 
issues such as “incidents Related to Mosques”, 
“qur’an burning” in the us, and, more generally, 
“manifestations of islamophobia” in usa and in 
europe. however, the report includes mentions of 
“constructive developments with regard to com-
bating islamophobia” and a direct reference to the 
international human rights “codex”.
With regard to the engagement of private organ-
isations and nGos, in the “christian” camp many 
agencies are active in reporting activities: for 
instance, “aid to the church in need” (acn)100 
regularly publishes a Report on Religious Free-
dom101 and a specialised survey on the situation of 
christians in the Middle east. 
in the field of hebraism, the anti-Defamation 
league102 publishes an annual Report, the pur-
pose of which is “combating anti-semitism, 
hatred and bigotry”. The mission statement of the 
aDl includes the following passages: “We moni-
tor and expose online hate and anti-semitism to 
make everyone aware of hidden threats. We keep 
government out of religion and religion out of 
government— and religion flourishes. our part-
nerships with law enforcement help us protect 
against violent extremists. (….) We help combat 
98. see http://www.oic-oci.org
99. organization of the islamic cooperation, Fifth OIC 
Observatory Report on Islamophobia, May 2011 to 
september 2012, available at: http://www.oic-oci.org/
uploads/file/islamphobia/reports/english/islampho-
bia-report-2012.pdf
100. see international website www.acn-intl.org
101. aid to the church in need, Christians and the Struggle 
for Religious Freedom, 2012, available at: http://www.
acnuk.org/data/files/acn_christians_and_the_
struggle_for_Religious_Freedom.pdf
102. see http://www.adl.org/about-adl/
as far as the “observers” are involved, it is not 
always easy to identify them with a specialised 
institution; more often, one rather finds a set of 
institutionalised practices of monitoring reli-
gious freedom. such practices, “institutionalised” 
through reiteration and internal or external legiti-
macy, are performed by different agencies (gov-
ernments, international organisations, private or 
non-governmental organisations). 
Legitimacy is the crucial test that most report-
ing activities on religious freedom fail to pass. in 
particular, “national” or “confessional” reports are 
strongly contested, whereas reporting initiatives 
performed by international organisations receive 
broader acceptance. Governmental reports are 
often rejected by the states considered incompliant 
on the grounds that the monitoring activity at the 
source of the criticism is unilateral, incomplete, or 
somewhat biased. Moreover, governmental reports 
on religious freedom feed a more fundamental 
questioning of the credibility of the observers, espe-
cially in cases where there are records of intoler-
ance in the territory of the country responsible for 
the “international” reporting activity. 
II. Current practices
as far as state-based monitoring is concerned, the 
most famous case is that of the us commission 
on Religious Freedom. under section 102 (b) of 
the international Religious Freedom act (iRFa) 
of 1998 the state Department office of interna-
tional Religious Freedom and its global network 
of  embassies have an obligation to produce an 
annual report on religious freedom throughout 
the world. The results lead to a classification of 
states under scrutiny. according to the categories 
currently used, a government may have “generally 
respected” the right of religious freedom or may 
have engaged in or tolerated “particularly severe 
violations” of religious freedoms (in which case it 
falls within the category of “countries of particu-
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global terror by connecting american and israeli 
law enforcement.” 103
legitimacy is far more accepted as a natural attri-
bute when it comes to the monitoring activities 
performed by international organisations. 
at international level, a un special Rapporteur on 
freedom of religion or belief104 has been appointed 
by the un human Rights council. his/her man-
date is “to identify existing or emerging obstacles 
to the enjoyment of the right of freedom of reli-
gion or belief and present recommendations on 
ways and means to overcome such obstacles”.105
The working method of the special Rapporteur 
relies fundamentally on the cooperation of state 
governments, which are also his/her main inter-
locutors for addressing cases of violations of the 
right to religious freedom. in practice, the special 
Rapporteur transmits appeals and letters of alle-
gation to states with regard to cases that represent 
infringements of or impediments to the exercise 
of the right of religion and belief; he/she also 
103. anti Defamation league annual Report, From Prob-
lem to Solutions, 2011, available at: http://archive.adl.
org/annual_report/annual_Report_2011.pdf
104. see http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/FreedomReligion/
Pages/FreedomReligionindex.aspx
105. according to the human Rights council Resolution 
n.6/37, the special Rapporteur must fulfil, among 
other duties, the following general goals: “ (a) to pro-
mote the adoption of measures at the national, regional 
and international levels to ensure the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief; 
(b) to identify existing and emerging obstacles to the 
enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion or belief 
and present recommendations on ways and means 
to overcome such obstacles; (c) to continue her/his 
efforts to examine incidents and governmental actions 
that are incompatible with the provisions of the Decla-
ration on the elimination of all Forms of intolerance 
and of Discrimination based on Religion or belief and 
to recommend remedial measures as appropriate; (d) 
to continue to apply a gender perspective, inter alia, 
through the identification of gender-specific abuses, 
in the reporting process, including in information 
collection and in recommendations”. 
undertakes fact-finding country visits and sub-
mits annual reports to the human Rights council 
and to the General assembly. 
in the eu Report on human Rights106 prepared by 
the eeas, one paragraph of the section “Thematic 
issues” is devoted to the Freedom of thought, con-
science and religion or belief. however, the topic is 
present in several eu Parliament Resolutions, in eu 
council “conclusions” and in important speeches 
delivered by prominent eu institutional leaders. 
in terms of policy consequences, it seems that 
reports originating from governmental monitoring 
activities are more effective. however, such a result 
comes at the expenses of legitimacy; one may argue 
that there is a clear trade-off between the wide 
acceptance of a report on religious freedom and the 
policy implications built on its conclusions. This is 
due, however, more to the limited supra-national 
powers of the international institution concerned 
than to the “credibility” of the report itself. in a way, 
“national” or intergovernmental reports are “docu-
ments with teeth”, whereas international reports 
are “documents with trust”. 
III. A case study: The Italian 
“Observatory on Religious 
Freedom” 
traditionally the italian Foreign Policy after 
World War ii, during the christian-Democrat led 
governments, has not articulated in an explicit 
manner the issue of religious freedom as a lead-
ing topic of international relations. This does not 
mean, however, that italian foreign policy ignored 
the issue; rather, religious freedom was “embed-
ded” in the italian approach to north africa and 
the Middle east, as one of the many aspects of 
the italian “projection” in the Mediterranean. in 
this domain, italian foreign policy was more the 
106. see 2011 edition, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/
human_rights/docs/2011_hr_report_en.pdf
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expression of complex domestic dynamics than 
the result of the influence of the cold War. 
at any rate, there was a mediated rather than a 
direct approach to religious freedom. The issue 
was considered a political one, to be dealt with 
through the traditional channels of foreign policy, 
rather than a subject relevant to the framework 
of the increasing “globalisation” and sometimes 
“multilateralisation” of human rights. Rather than 
a matter of principle, it was a question of politi-
cal realism, prudent foreign policy and respon-
sible attitude. Religious freedom was not seen as 
a normative question, but rather as the result of 
pragmatic and subtle initiatives in the bilateral 
relations of italy with Middle eastern countries. 
a very different model was followed by the italian 
foreign policy with the eastern european coun-
tries in the Warsaw Pact bloc, where the issue was 
considered intractable, at least until the election of 
Pope John Paul ii. 
in africa, religious freedom often took the form 
of protecting catholic Missionaries and their 
initiatives. 
This approach was implemented rather forcefully 
under the christian Democratic Governments, in 
particular during the era of andreotti (who was 
Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Minister 
of Foreign affairs several times from the early ‘70s 
until the early ’90s). 
With the end of the cold War, religious freedom 
surfaced in a different way as a specific subject of 
foreign policy. however, within the italian Min-
istry of Foreign affairs, religions were not seen 
as part of the fundamental challenges of interna-
tional relations until recent times. The catholic 
religion was long considered an asset for the ital-
ian Foreign Policy, since the country was inevi-
tably regarded abroad as the host of the Vatican 
and home for the holy Father. The presence of old 
and strong catholic “minorities” in the Middle 
east and north africa, in particular, was seen as 
an important tool for strengthening the role of the 
country in the region. 
a fundamental change occurred after 9/11 and 
the launching of the so-called “global war on ter-
ror” during the first Presidential term of George 
W. bush. The political turn to the right taken by 
the italian politics with the Premiership of silvio 
berlusconi seemed to encourage a sort of neo-
conservative interpretation of religion as a prob-
lem rather than as a part of the solution, with a 
special emphasis on radical islam and its more 
violent and intolerant expressions. however, this 
particular approach regarding the place of religion 
in foreign policy was never endorsed, as such, by 
the italian diplomatic service, which maintained 
a more realistic and concerned attitude based on 
the pursuit of the fundamental interests of the 
country in the area. The assertive tone on religious 
freedom often used by the Minister of Foreign 
affairs Franco Frattini was, consequently, a com-
bination of an internal and legitimate ideologi-
cal agenda, a genuine concern for the respect of a 
fundamental human rights and an issue related to 
the role of italy in the region. in this context, the 
narrative on religious freedom was fundamentally 
based upon the concept of “protecting” christian 
minorities, although officially the rationale was 
the advancement of religious freedom as a univer-
sal value. The issue of protection was also viewed 
with some concern in the Vatican, since it seemed 
to give some foundation to the accusation that the 
christians in the Middle east were acting as “for-
eigners”, despite the fact that they had been living 
on the land for centuries and well before the birth 
of islam. Moreover, the emphasis on religious free-
dom ran the risk of being counterproductive and 
self-defeating, insofar as there were parties in the 
coalition of the centre-right (such as Lega Nord) 
that showed forms of intolerance against Muslims 
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and their religious practices, especially when the 
construction of Mosques on italian soil was at 
stake. in particular, the argument of “reciprocity” 
(freedom of religion for the christians in the Mid-
dle east in exchange of freedom of religion for the 
Muslim minorities in europe and italy) under-
mined the universality of the claim in favour of 
freedom of religion as a fundamental right (and, 
as such, not subject, by definition, to conditional-
ity and pre-conditions). 
in this context, the role played by professional 
diplomats was crucial to keeping the issue of reli-
gious freedom on track as a new field of the italian 
foreign policy, without yielding to a faith-based 
diplomatic approach. The role of the Directorate 
for Political and security affairs was relevant and 
diplomats contributed in an intelligent manner 
to the aim of crafting an italian approach to the 
topic in the broader framework of global human 
rights advocacy. several initiatives were also 
taken in international fora (such as the united 
nations), in cooperation with relevant partners 
(for instance, spain, Jordan, and indonesia). a 
good opportunity was provided by the creation, in 
the French Ministry of Foreign affairs, of a spe-
cial unit (“Pôle Religions”) in charge of religious 
issues107. The Policy Planning unit of the Farne-
sina decided, in turn, with the support of the lead-
ership of the Ministry, to launch in 2009 a new 
domain of policy-oriented research, the general 
goal of which was to analyse the role of religions 
in international relations. it was in this broader 
context that the issue of religious freedom was to 
be addressed by italian (professional) diplomacy, 
leaving the more vocal advocacy of “protection” 
of christians in the Middle east to politicians. 
The Policy Planning unit organizes, together with 
the Milan-based italian think tank “isPi” and the 
Province of trento, an annual seminar on this 
107. Joseph Maïla, Pourquoi un pôle “Religions” au Quai 
d’Orsay, available at: http://www.delegfrance-conseil-
europe.org/spip.php?article431
topic, held in october, hosting activists, policy 
makers, academics and diplomats. other events 
were created in cooperation with “Religions for 
Peace” and the european university institute in 
Florence, which hosted a conference on religious 
freedom co-sponsored by the italian and spanish 
Foreign Ministries, with the participation of the 
Ministers of both countries (Franco Frattini and 
trinidad Jiménez)108. an international workshop 
on “Promoting Religious Freedom and Peaceful 
coexistence” was recently organised by the ital-
ian Ministry of Foreign affairs and isPi109. 
Those initiatives ran in parallel with more sym-
bolic actions sponsored by the Minister of Foreign 
affairs himself. For instance, Foreign Minister 
Franco Frattini received on 26 January 2011 the 
“italy for asia bibi: freedom, justice and human 
rights” committee, an informal grouping of asso-
ciations that has sprung up to defend asia bibi, the 
christian Pakistani woman condemned to death 
for blasphemy and to the release of whom Minis-
ter Frattini was strongly committed. after the cruel 
assassination of the Pakistani Minister shahbaz 
bhatti, a huge banner with bhatti’s image and name 
was placed outside of the italian Foreign Ministry 
in March 2011, to commemorate the man and to 
affirm the commitment of italian diplomacy to the 
defence of religious freedom in the world. 
For his part, Minister terzi was very vocal in 
condemning the series of “hate-driven attacks” 
against christians at worship in nigeria.110 on 
27 september 2012 Minister terzi, together with 
the Jordanian foreign minister nasser Judeh, co-
108. see Franco Frattini and trinidad Jiménez, Frattini: 
“la libertà Religiosa come questione di cittadinanza”, 
Avvenire, 18/06/2011, available at: http://www.esteri.
it/Mae/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interv-
iste/2011/06/20110620_liberta_religiosa.htm
109. in Rome, 11.2.2013.
110. Press release, available at: http://www.esteri.it/Mae/en/
sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2012/10/20121029_
attentatonigeria.htm
Freedom of Religion or Belief in Foreign Policy. Which one?64
chaired an international conference “on civil soci-
ety and human rights education as a tool for dis-
seminating religious tolerance”, in the margins of 
the un General assembly. The event aimed “to 
foster religious tolerance and the defence of free-
dom of religion and beliefs (FoRb) and religious 
minorities”. 111 15 foreign ministers and high-level 
delegates participated, including the high com-
missioner for human rights, Mr. Pillay, along 
with 39 civil society delegations.
a more structural approach to the freedom of 
religion in terms of reporting activities has been 
recently attempted by the italian Ministry of For-
eign affairs with the creation of an “observatory 
on Religious Freedom”. according to the official 
statement released on the day of the presenta-
tion of the initiative, “following the lead of the 
united states, canada and other countries, italy 
too has set up an observatory on Religious Free-
dom to monitor and combat violations of religious 
freedom around the world, beginning with the 
areas at risk where religious minorities are being 
persecuted.”112 The observatory was established by 
the italian Minister of Foreign affairs and the city 
of Rome and is run by a coordinator, the sociologist 
Massimo introvigne, and four other members: two 
diplomats specialised in the field of human Rights, 
and two representatives from nGos. Minister terzi 
and Mayor alemanno signed a Protocol of Under-
standing at the Foreign Ministry in January 2012 
to establish the observatory.
“The Observatory – according to the official 
mission statement - was conceived in 2011 
after the wave of attacks against Christian 
communities in the Middle East. Its aim 
111. Press release, available at: http://www.esteri.it/Mae/
en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondi-
menti/2012/09/20120928_assembleaGeneraleonu.htm
112. Press release, available at: http://www.esteri.it/Mae/
en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondi-
menti/2012/06/20120622_Roma.htm
was to create – together with our Represen-
tation to the Holy See – a body dedicated to 
intensifying the efforts of Italy and the inter-
national community in protecting religious 
minorities.”113 The rationale provided for the 
establishment of the Observatory is the fol-
lowing: “The promotion of religious freedom 
in all its forms, and the protection of religious 
minorities throughout the world, are a pri-
ority of Italy’s foreign policy and its ethical 
dimension. This key strand of our country’s 
international activities has recently gained 
an even higher profile in the wake of the 
horrific episodes of violence against Chris-
tian communities in the African continent. 
(…) The world looks to our capital city as 
a beacon of dialogue and tolerance among 
religious faiths; as the seat of Christianity’s 
greatest basilica and the biggest mosque in 
Europe; and as the home of the world’s oldest 
Jewish community.”114 
however, the mission of the observatory remains 
unclear. The new body is expected to collect, check 
and release information on violations of religious 
freedom in the world, but no precise indication 
thus far exists regarding the possible compilation 
of an official and public report based on input 
received by the italian diplomatic network. More-
over, no direct policy consequences seem to be 
attached to the violation of religious freedoms, 
other than those possibly taken through diplo-
matic channels and at eu or un level. appar-
ently, according to a recent statement by the coor-
dinator, Massimo introvigne, the role of italy 
should be that of “coalition building” in order to 
intervene “sometimes in public, sometimes dis-
cretely” in cases where the freedom of religion 
113. Press release, available at: http://www.esteri.it/
Mae/en/sa la_ stampa/areaGiorna l ist i /note-
stampa/2012/07/20120717_notaservizionigeria.htm
114. ibid.
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is threatened.115 The very nature of the observa-
tory therefore needs to be clarified. The presence 
of professional diplomats on the board makes if 
very different, for instance, from the us commis-
sion on international Religious Freedom, since the 
latter is composed of independent commissioners 
appointed by congress and by the President. Dip-
lomats should deal with religion as a fundamen-
tal matter in international relations and for the 
advancement of human rights; they should not be 
directly involved, however, in reporting activities 
sponsored by their governments rather than those 
backed by international organisations, since it is 
almost impossible to separate such activities from 
a national foreign policy agenda based both on 
values and interests.
115. Press release, available at: http://www.esteri.it/Mae/
it/sa la_ stampa/archiv ionotizie/approfondi-
menti/2012/06/20120622_Roma.htm
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